Good Reasons to Believe: Are Moral Arguments Any Good?
Here is my talk on the Moral Arguments. A few points were rushed towards the end. And I was getting a lot of audio in my headphones, which I should have muted because it distracted me. So apologies for that! Otherwise, I think it is a helpful summary of some of the major issues, as well as a brief introduction to my modalized version of the argument. I hope to take my modalized version of the argument to the next level by presenting it at some conferences, but it still needs some work.
Enjoy!
Upcoming: Good Reasons to Believe talk “Are Moral Arguments Any Good?”
This Sunday I will be on Good Reasons to Believe asking the question “Are Moral Arguments Any Good?”
In the show, I will develop a couple of versions of the moral argument, and assess whether I think they are ultimately successful. In particular, I will focus on the Kantian version of the argument, which may be less familiar to some. So tune in!
Details: the show streams through Ustream live (Sunday 6/9 4pm UK time, 11am EST, 10 am CST). You should be able to find the show through this link NCG Studios: The Place. See you there!!
P.S. If you miss the show, I’ll post the YouTube archive when it becomes available.
An Indispensability Argument for God’s Existence
An Indispensability Argument for God’s Existence:
1. Whatever is indispensable in generating some theoretically insightful thought experiments must be admitted into our ontology.
2. A perfect being, or God, is indispensable in the generation of many theoretically insightful thought experiments across multiple disciplines.
3. Therefore, a perfect being must be admitted into our ontology.
I don’t think this argument works because (1) is too strong a claim. There are indispensable entities in many thought experiments, which we don’t admit into our ontologies, like frictionless planes and ideal gases. Nonetheless, those ideas are useful in many thought experiments. But why should they be so useful? I think it is because they substantively entail certain facts were they to actually obtain.
A Modest Indispensability Argument for God’s Existence:
1. Whatever is indispensable in generating some theoretically insightful thought experiments is logically possible (premise).
2. A perfect being, or God, is indispensable in generating some theoretically insightful thought experiments (premise).
3. Therefore, a perfect being is logically possible (From 1,2).
4. If a perfect being is logically possible, then a perfect being exists (by S5, given that a perfect being has necessary existence).
5. Therefore, a perfect being exists (From 3,4).
It seems to me that this argument is sound. An atheist might reject (1), but if something is logically impossible, it is hard to see why it would be theoretically indispensable, since it would entail anything. Impossible entities are, therefore, dispensable, since they function trivially in the thought experiment, and any impossible entity would function in the same way. So one impossible entity is no more indispensable than any other. What’s more, while impossibilities entail anything, we would find ourselves like Buridan’s ass, not directed by the concept itself in any particular way when thinking through the thought experiment. Rather, the direction would be determined by some sort of misapprehension of what a perfect being is–a misapprehension that oddly happens to be shared by every person who grasps the thought experiment. But then it is the “misapprehension” of a perfect being that is functioning indispensably, and we would have to see why it is the case that we are dealing with a misapprehension rather than the concept of a perfect being.
I think the atheist might be more successful in denying (2), by arguing that the idea of a perfect being is not actually integral to many thought experiments. Of course, this places a huge burden on the atheist of wading through thought experiments that make use of a perfect being, so as to demonstrate dispensability. Absent such a demonstration, it seems to me that thought experiments that make use of God do so in a substantive and indispensable manner. For as Voltaire says, “Si Dieu n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer” (Epistle to the author of the book, The Three Impostors, 1768). Except, if it is necessary to invent God, then according to my reasoning, God is logically possible, and so actual.
A Modalized Moral Argument
The follow argument attempts to do a few things:
A) It tries to ground the intuition that only God could be the ontological ground of moral values. That is, if God exists, then the cause of facts in the world is identical to the cause of values, and so facts cannot be divorced from values, a la Hume.
B) It provides a straightforward account of value by which a thing can be said to have value if goodness is said of it in relation to something. A thing could be said to have subjective and extrinsic value to, say, me if it is a good in virtue of my being. I take intrinsic value, then, to be a modal property where a thing is good in virtue of itself in all possible worlds. This is because a defender of intrinsic moral values will say that something like a human being is necessarily good in virtue of itself in all possible worlds, even if humans don’t obtain in every possible world. Rather, should a human come into existence in said world, it would have intrinsic goodness.
Finally, C) the argument attempts to show that the mere logical possibility of intrinsic values is sufficient to prove God’s existence. This depends upon my use of the S5 axiom, and a corollary to the Barcan Formula. So while the atheist might object to the traditional non-modal version of the moral argument on the grounds that objective and intrinsic moral values don’t actually exist, this version of the argument forces the atheist into the position of saying that intrinsic moral values are plausibly logically incoherent, or metaphysically impossible. But I see no reason why it is incoherent or impossible to be necessarily good in virtue of itself, at least prima facie.
One might note that my defense of the need for God as the ontological foundation for values depends upon a few theological notions. The first is that God is the eminent cause of truth and goodness in the world. Thus, God is the supreme exemplar of truth and goodness. Furthermore, Hume’s so called fork is circumvented in classical theism through the doctrine of Divine Simplicity, wherein Goodness and Truth are merely transcendental modes that, while perspectively distinct to finite knowers like us, are identical to Being itself, and therefore, God.
Let
Gxy – x is good in virtue of y; something has intrinsic value iff it is necessarily good in virtue of itself, or □Gxx
t – the eminent cause of truth in all things
g – the eminent cause of goodness in all things
θx – x is divine
1. (∀x) [(□Gxx) → □(t = g)] (premise)
2. (∀x) {□(t = g) ≡ [□(x = t) & □(x = g)]} (premise)
3. (∀x) {[□(x = t) & □(x = g)] → θx} (premise)
4. ◊(∃x)□Gxx (premise)
→5. ~(∃x)θx (assumption)
↑6. ~θu (5 EI)
↑7. [□(u = t) & □(u = g)] → θu (3 UI)
↑8. ~[□(u = t) & □(u = g)] (6,7 MT)
↑9. □(t = g) ≡ [□(u = t) & □(u = g)] (2, UI)
↑10. {□(t = g) → [□(u = t) & □(u = g)]} & {[□(u = t) & □(u = g)] → □(t = g)} (9 Equiv)
↑11. □(t = g) → [□(u = t) & □(u = g)] (10 Simp)
↑12. ~□(t = g) (8,11 MT)
↑13. □Guu → □(t = g) (1 UI)
↑14. ~□Guu (12,13 MT)
↑15. (∀x)~□Gxx (14 UG)
←——————————————–
16. ~(∃x)θx → (∀x)~□Gxx (5-15 CP)
17. ~(∃x)θx → ~(∃x) □Gxx (16, QN)
18. ◊(∃x)□Gxx → (∃x)◊□Gxx (CBF)
19. (∃x)◊□Gxx (4,18 MP)
20. (∃x)◊□Gxx → (∃x)□Gxx (S5 axiom)
21. (∃x)□Gxx (19,20 MP)
22. ~~(∃x)□Gxx (21 DN)
23. ~~(∃x)θx (17,22 MT)
24. (∃x)θx (23 DN)
More needs to be argued by way of the premises, but I think this moral argument is more powerful than those traditionally offered in defense of theism.
William Lane Craig lectures on naturalistic alternatives to the Big Bang
Here's the lecture, which was given in 2004 at the University of Colorado, Boulder. A very liberal university!
This lecture is suitable for intermediate and advanced Christian apologists.
The description of the video states:
This is quite simply one of the best lectures William Lane Craig (a philosopher of science) has given. Craig explores the origins of the universe. He argues for a beginning of the universe, while refuting scientific models like the Steady State Theory, the Oscillating Theory, Quantum Vacuum Fluctuation Model, Chaotic Inflationary Theory, Quantum Gravity Theory, String Theory, M-Theory and Cyclic Ekpyrotic Theory.
Happy Easter!
The Resurrection of Jesus.
1 But at daybreak on the first day of the week they took the spices they had prepared and went to the tomb.
2 They found the stone rolled away from the tomb;
3 but when they entered, they did not find the body of the Lord Jesus.
4 While they were puzzling over this, behold, two men in dazzling garments appeared to them.
5 They were terrified and bowed their faces to the ground. They said to them, “Why do you seek the living one among the dead?
6 He is not here, but he has been raised. Remember what he said to you while he was still in Galilee,
7 that the Son of Man must be handed over to sinners and be crucified, and rise on the third day.”
8 And they remembered his words.
9 Then they returned from the tomb and announced all these things to the eleven and to all the others.
10 The women were Mary Magdalene, Joanna, and Mary the mother of James; the others who accompanied them also told this to the apostles,
11 but their story seemed like nonsense and they did not believe them.
12 But Peter got up and ran to the tomb, bent down, and saw the burial cloths alone; then he went home amazed at what had happened.
SEP update on Medieval Theories of Modality
There have been some important updates to the SEP entry “Medieval Theories of Modality” by Simo Knuuttila. Here is an excerpt pertaining to my interests in the contemporary analysis of Aristotle:
There are several recent works on Aristotle’s modal syllogistics, but no generally accepted historical reconstruction which would make it a coherent theory. It was apparently based on various assumptions which were not fully compatible (Hintikka 1973, Striker 2009). Some commentators have been interested in finding coherent layers of the theory by explicating them in terms of Aristotle’s other views (van Rijen 1989; Patterson 1995). There are also several formal reconstructions such as Rini 2010 (modern predicate logic), Ebert and Nortmann 2007 (possible worlds semantics), various set-theoretical approaches discussed in Johnson 2004, and Malink 2006 (mereological semantics).
I’m going to take a closer look at Striker’s position, as I am not convinced that Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is based on assumptions that are “not fully compatible”. I think the issue is one of getting clear on Aristotle’s metaphysics at the time that the Prior Analytics were composed, and to realize that some of those metaphysical presuppositions did not remain constant as Aristotle went on to work on De Caelo and Metaphysics. I like Malink’s approach of using the Topics in order to understand what is going on. Perhaps a post or two dedicated to the “Two Barbaras” problem is in order!
Formalizing Aquinas’ Fourth Way
A “less obese” Thomas for a bare-bones formal representation of the 4th way!
I am interested in Aquinas’ Fourth Way, but I find that he lays out the argument so succinctly in the Summa Theologiae that it’s hard to see a valid proof at first blush:
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God (ST I, 2.3).
I would like to eventually work out a stronger version of the argument–stronger, that is, by weaken some of the premises and show that they still lead to the conclusion that God exists. But, my first step is to try and properly depict the essence of the argument in its purest logical form. I think I have to quantify over predicates to capture what I think Aquinas is saying. Also, I’ve used the transcendental of “Truth” as the particular perfection in this formulation of the argument. I chose “Truth” because I didn’t want this to come off as a moral argument by using “Goodness”, and I didn’t want to use “Being” because I fear being slowed down by the “existence is not a real predicate” objection, though I think there are very good responses to that objection. Finally, I confess that I might have tripped up over some of my brackets, so forgive the crudeness of this draft, if crudeness you should find. I happily admit that the errors and misrepresentations are all my own, and not poor Thomas’ fault! So…
Let:
Πxy – x has a greater degree of predicate Π than y
ExΠy –x is the eminent cause of y being Π
Θx – x has godhood
Txy – x has a greater degree of truth than y
ExTy – x is the eminent cause of y being true
(NB: I use x, y, and z as variables and u, v, and w as pseudonyms)
1. (∀x){Θx ≡ (∀y)[(x≠y) → (Txy & ExTy)]} (definition)
2. (∀Π){(∀x)[(∀y)[Πxy → (∃z)[((z≠x) → (Πzx & EzΠx))]]]} (premise)
3. (∃x)(∃y)Txy (premise)
∴(∃x)Θx
Deduction:
4. (∃y)Tuy (3 EI)
5. Tuv (4 EI)
6. (∀x){(∀y)[Txy → (∃z)[(z≠x) →( Tzx & EzTx)]]} (2 UI)
7. (∀y)[Tuy → (∃z)[(z≠u) → (Tzu & EzTu)]] (6 UI)
8. Tuv → (∃z)[(z≠u) → (Tzu & EzTu)] (7 UI)
9. (∃z)((z≠u) → (Tzu & EzTu) (5,8 MP)
10. (w≠u) → (Twu & EwTu) (9 EI)
11. Θw ≡ (∀y)[(w≠y) →(Twy & EwTy)] (1 UI)
12. {Θw → (∀y)[(w≠y) → (Twy & EwTy)]} & { (∀y)[(w≠y) → (Twy & EwTy)] → Θw} (11 Equiv)
13. (∀y)[(w≠y) → (Twy & EwTy)] → Θw (12 Simp)
14. [(w≠u) → (Twu & EwTu)] → Θw (13 UI)
15. Θw (10,14 MP)
16. (∃x)Θx (15 EG)
If you see any problems, let me know in the comments! On a lighter note, here is another version of the Fourth Way that I did with the help of lyrics from the 1980′s classic Higher Love, because if you think about it, there must be higher love…
[Update: My very bright and patient friend, Damon Watson, noticed some problems with the brackets and I have made changes accordingly]
Good Reasons to Believe: Daniel Vecchio & Marc Belcastro
Here is my interview of Marc Belcastro and his defense of the Contingency Argument.
Marc was an excellent guest and helped me through as a first time host. Excellent job, Marc!
“Good Reasons to Believe” Interview of Marc Belcastro Tomorrow (2/10)
Tomorrow I will be interviewing Marc Belcastro on “Good Reasons to Believe”. Marc’s talk is entitled “The Contingency Argument for God’s Existence”. He will be explaining the Leibnizian Cosmological argument, and I get to grill him a little! Marc is an excellent and careful philosopher, so this should be good. Also, it will be my birthday, so the best gift to me would be for you to tune in (I am not sure that that would be a sufficient reason to tune in, but it’s some sort of reason)!
Bio: Marc Belcastro is a Christian theist, of the Anselmian Trinitarian variety. His primary philosophical interests include philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Concerning philosophy of religion, his attention has lately been occupied by two contemporary versions of the cosmological argument as well as by divine command theory. Concerning philosophical theology, he’s recently been attempting to develop some work on the respective Christian doctrines of the Trinity and of final punishment. Marc also has an affection for metaphysics and coffee, together or apart. He intends to pursue a PhD in philosophy in the near future, and he also aspires to become a father, a novelist, and a better cook. Marc, his excellent wife Shelly, and their pretty cute dog Tibby live in Dayton, Ohio.
Details: the show streams through Ustream live (Sunday 2/10 4pm UK time, 11am EST, 10 am CST). You should be able to find the show through this link NCG Studios: The Place. Hope you’ll tune in!
P.S. If you miss the show, I’ll post the YouTube archive when it becomes available.
