This was all over my Facebook feed. Pretty funny!
This hymn sets up some of the themes of my argument, so please listen to it first!
I take Christian Unitarianism to be the conjunction of the positions that Jesus of Narazerth is the Messiah by whose death and resurrection salvation entered the world, and that Jesus of Nazareth is not the same being, substance, or person as God the Father. Christian Unitarians can take a variety of positions with respect to Christology, e.g. the view that Jesus was fully human and led a sinless life, and was elevated to a divine-like status, that Jesus was an angelic being, Michael for example, who took on flesh, or that Jesus was a lesser deity who existed prior to creation eternally or before creation began, i.e. he was the Logos, which should be construed as a demiurge who acted on behalf of an utterly transcendent higher God.
First, I should motivate some aspects of my premises regarding the nature of God. Though we cannot understand God fully, I do believe that the Christian God is that being than which none greater can be conceived. If Christian Unitarians reject that definition, that’s fine, but I also think that the Anselmian God actually exists, and anything that is not this “Anselmian God” is a false god who is unworthy of worship.
Second, 1 John 4:8 tells us that God is love. Given that the Anselmian God is the greatest conceivable being, and that love is a perfection, it stands to reason that if there is an Anselmian God, that God exemplifies a love than which none greater can be had. Otherwise, one might easily conceive of a greater God.
So the argument is this:
D1: God is that than which none greater can be conceived. [Anselmian definition]
P1: If God is that than which none greater can be conceived, God exemplifies that love than which none greater can be had.
C1: God exemplifies that love than which none greater can be had. [From D1 & P1 MP]
D2: That love than which none greater can be had is laying down one’s own life for a friend. [Definition from Jn 15:13]
P2: If Christian Unitarianism is true, it is not the case that God exemplifies laying down one’s own life for a friend.
C2: If Christian Unitarianism is true, it is not the case that God exemplifies that love than which none greater can be had. [From D2 & P2]
C3: Christian Unitarianism is false. [From C1 & C2 DN + MT]
Some possible responses:
1: On Trinitarian Christianity, God did not exemplify that love than which none greater can be had until 33AD. Therefore, God is not the Anselmian God, since a God that has laid down his own life for a friend for a greater amount of time is greater.
R1: God is an eternal and omniscient being. In creating the World, and from His perspective, the Trinitarian God already exemplifies this love for all time. From all time, his sacrifice is exemplified. Temporally, it happened for us on a particular date in history. Moreover, Christ laid down his life for all, including past humans. That the act of laying down one’s life for a friend did not happen at the earliest moment of history does not cheapen the act, since an earlier sacrifice would not have been for more “friends.”
2: The Trinitarian God only laid down his life once. One could conceive of a God who lays down his life more times. So the Trinitarian God is not the Anselmian God.
R2: The quantity of times one lays down one’s life is not the issue, but when it is done for a friendship. Christ died that all may be counted as friends. And he did this in friendship and obedience to the other persons of the Trinity. Thus, there is no “friend” for whom Christ could lay down his life a second time. The fallen angels are forever enemies of God by their will, so they are not among the set of possible friends for whom God could lay down his life again.
3: John 15:13 is really about the greatest act of love a human can do, not the greatest act any “one” can do. Or Christ was using hyperbole. Or the act does not include God, who is capable of a higher act of love. Or it is logically impossible for God to exemplify this human act of love.
R3: The Greek in John 15:13 doesn’t limit the case to humans, but just uses the pronouns “οὐδεὶς,” “τις,” and “αὐτοῦ.” These are reasonably translated as “no one,” “one,” and “of him.” So it isn’t clear from the text that the case is limited to human beings. Given that Christ would go on to lay down his life for humanity, it would be strange to think that he was just being hypebolic here. If he were being hyperbolic and there is some greater act of love, what is it? What act of love does God do that would be greater than had he laid down his life for our salvation? The burden would be on the Christian Unitarian to make the case that some other act of love is greater, despite the Scripture. Finally, if it is argued that it is simply logically impossible that God lay down his life for a friend, then this puts the Christian Unitarian in the uncomfortable position of trying to demonstrate that the incarnation is a logical absurdity. Some might take up this task, but it is not an easy task.
With respect to my response to the third objection, I would like to emphasize a couple of other issues. A) It seems to me that one of the beautiful messages of Christianity is this theodicy, if it can be called a theodicy, that doesn’t seek to explain away evil, but says that God entered into this veil of tears too. God humbled himself and experienced evil directly. Christian Unitarianism seems to cheapen this “theodicy” because it tells us that God remains distant and somehow thinks sending someone on his behalf is “good enough.” Relatedly, B) Christian Unitarianism tells us that the death of one sinless human (or semi-divine being) was sufficient to atone for sin. On theories of the atonement, like the satisfaction theory, this cheapens the debt of sin. On Trinitarianism, a divine person of the Holy Trinity, laid down his life for us all. The life of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity is His own. No creature can claim to own his or her life in the same way a divine, necessary, and eternal being can. So, if Christ were just another creature, the offering of his life would be less significant. It would be offering something that, in some sense, belonged to the Father in the same way any other creaturely life belongs to the Father. If the Unitarian chooses to escape this by positing a co-eternal, necessarily existing per se, lesser divinity (polytheism), this conflicts with aseity, which is arguably a great-making property. Also, such a move seems ad hoc, since I don’t think any Christian Unitarians would say that the Logos is per se necessary, i.e. necessarily exists of itself and not by the necessity of the Father (higher God).
There is one last objection that occurs to me (though there may be others):
4: Even if God exemplifies the highest form of love through Christ’s sacrifice, on Trinitarianism, it is only one persons of the Trinity who exemplifies this love. The Father and the Holy Spirit either cannot, or do not exemplify this love.
R4: Being of one substance, God can be said to exemplify this love. And this love is exemplified to a higher degree since one being exemplified it, not merely through one person, but all three. For it is the Father who sent the Son, and it was by the Power of the Holy Spirit that the Son became incarnate. Thus the supreme act of love is one act by one Being who, being multi-personal, stands in different relations to the act. The Father sends the Son, which is the very act by which the Son is sent by the Father. And this is the act by which God so loved the World (Jn 3:16). Whether the Father or the Holy Spirit could have incarnated instead of the Son is an interesting question. But, if my earlier point is correct, it is not a supreme act of love to merely lay down one’s life. So only one of the Persons could have done this if the act was for all “friends.” A second passion via another Person of the Trinity would not affect anything more for God’s friends. So it is not necessary that God exemplify this sacrifice by all Three Persons laying down incarnated lives. Once was sufficient, and all three persons were completely involved in the event, though by different relations.
Thanks to Andrew Terrell for a conversation which helped stimulate some of these thoughts. Though, I should say that any heretical views expressed here are my own.
For any argument against naturalism, we are going to have to specify the sort of naturalism we are discussing. Here, my target is a rather broad notion of metaphysical naturalism. Let’s define the notion in the following way: naturalism is the thesis that reality is exhausted by the natural. This is, admittedly not an informative definition (and somewhat circular), but it will do the job of being relatively broad for this argument, but not so vacuous as to be uninteresting. Many contemporary naturalists would assent to the definition, and I, being Catholic, believe that naturalism, so defined, is false.
P1. Naturalism is true just in case “natural” is greater than and includes the combined extensions of terms that name each and every one of the categories into which being may be divided.
P2. “Natural” is greater than and includes the combined extensions of terms that name each and every one of the categories into which being may be divided just in case “natural” is a transcendental that is convertible with “being”.
P3. All terms that are transcendental that are convertible with “being” are necessarily transcendentals that are convertible with “being”.
P4. If naturalism is true, naturalism is contingently true.
P5. If naturalism is contingently true, it is false that “natural” is necessarily a transcendental that is convertible with being.
C1. Therefore, naturalism is false.
The argument is a reductio, as the premises lead to an obvious contradiction if one assumes naturalism is true (i.e. “natural” is necessarily a transcendental that is convertible with “being” and it is false that “natural” is necessarily a transcendental that is convertible with “being”). Given the definition of “transcendental” and the plausibility of P3-P5, naturalism cannot be the case.
There are a few ways the naturalist may object (and why I think they are inadequate objections):
Objection 1: “Natural” is not a transcendental.
Reply to 1: If “natural” is not a transcendental, as defined extensionally, then it is not exhaustive of reality. Let’s say that reality is composed of everything, all beings. If “natural” doesn’t exhaust all beings, then there are beings that are not natural. That, to me, is sufficient to falsify metaphysical naturalism. So this is not a very good move to make, though it may be a knee-jerk move to make in response to the argument.
Objection 2: There are no transcendentals. The idea that res, unum, aliquid, bonum, et verum or any other supposed transcendental like “beauty” is convertible with being is a quaint notion from an outmoded era of philosophy and theology when people drank in far too many Hellenistic notions.
Reply to 2: Fine, you dislike older ideas. But the extensional definition of transcendentals are still be on the table and there is no reason to think that we cannot categorize being, or devise a notion of a term that is universal. After all, as I suggested in response to the first objection, to say that “natural” exhaust reality is to say something about the universality of “natural” and that its extension would be as broad as “being” or “reality”. So, it sounds odd to object to there being transcendental terms when naturalism, so defined, depends on it. Ah, but “naturalism” could be defined in other ways. That’s true, but those sorts of “naturalisms” are not the target of this argument. Moreover, I am not too sure that I am opposed to a form of metaphysical naturalism that is too timid to claim that “natural” exhausts “being”.
Objection 3: P3 is false. There is no reason to think that if some term is convertible with “being”, then it is necessarily so. It might be contingently convertible with being, especially if “transcendental” is only being defined extensionally. That is, the transcendentals could merely happen to be convertible with “being”.
Reply to 3: It would seem, then, that we have two sorts of transcendentals: contingent transcendentals that happen to be convertible with “being” and necessary transcendentals that are necessarily convertible with “being”. So, for instance, if God were actually to exist, there would be a sense in which res, unum, aliquid, bonum, et verum could be applied to God. But, presumably, if God were to exist, “natural” could not apply to Him. In other words, were there super-natural beings, “natural” would have a smaller extension than “being” and “natural” would cease to be a transcendental. Yet, the other named transcendentals are not like this. No matter what possibilia comes to be, the transcendentals would remain what they are. It’s just that the actualization of the possibilia means that the actuality is res, unum, aliquid, bonum, et verum. It seems, then, that the naturalist would be committed to the thesis that “natural” is convertible with “actual”, i.e. everything is actual if and only if it is natural. But “actuality” is not a transcendental. Rather, one can divide the various categories of being into act and potency. In other words, actuality has a smaller extension than any given category and, a fortiori the combined extensions of all the categories of being. Now the naturalist might quibble and say that any potential or possibility of the non-natural, or supernatural, is itself natural. But this is not to address the question of whether “natural” is extensive with all potentials and possibilities, but just the actualities in which those potentials and possibilities obtain.
Another issue is that it is rather question-begging to demand that “natural” is one instance of a “contingent transcendental” convertible with being given what actually happens to exist. Is there another such transcendental? Why are all the other transcendentals necessary and remain transcendentals no matter what happens to be in the world.
Objection 4: P4 is false. Metaphysical worldviews, if true, are necessarily true. Thus, if metaphysical naturalism is true, then it is somehow necessarily true.
Reply to 4: This is a rather strong position to take. For it not only posits that supernatural entities, like souls, and gods, do not exist. It posits that they cannot exist for metaphysical or broadly logical reasons. It is not clear to me why this must be the case, and there seems to be good reason to think this is false. 1) Even if it is not supposed that the Anselmian God is metaphysically possible (from which, some would argue, His existence could be demonstrated), a less than maximally great or perfect divinity is plausibly metaphysically possible. That is, a being that would sufficiently falsify naturalism, even if it is not morally perfect, omniscient, or omnipotent, could exist. What’s more, if metaphysical naturalism is metaphysically necessary, then it would satisfy the Leibnizian question “why is there something rather than nothing” in much the way classical theists think God satisfies this question. The classical theist says that God is metaphysically necessary, so not anything existing is impossible. But the metaphysical naturalist doesn’t seem to make the same move. Faced with the radical contingency of reality, the metaphysical naturalist usually doesn’t say that since metaphysical naturalism is metaphysical necessary, there must be at least one natural thing in existence. If nothing were in existence, then nothing natural would exist. Now a particularly impish naturalist might suggest that, were there nothing in existence, metaphysical naturalism would be true. That is, one natural configuration of the world is “there not being anything”. But if there were nothing, it wouldn’t be the case that “natural” exhausts reality. “Natural” would not be predicated at all. It would no more “exhaust” reality than “supernatural”. So there not being anything is not compatible with metaphysical naturalism being true. So if metaphysical naturalism is necessary, nothing is intrinsically impossible. Yet, we have no reason to think that if naturalism is true, some natural thing or other must exist.
Objection 5: Okay, metaphysical naturalism is only contingently true, but “natural” is necessarily a transcendental convertible with being anyways. In other words, P5 is false.
Reply to 5: Well, if there is no possible world where “natural” fails to exhaust “being”, then metaphysical naturalism would be true in every possible world. Metaphysical naturalism cannot be contingent while it be necessary the everything is natural. That just is to claim that metaphysical naturalism is true in every possible world (a strong claim to make).
In Sum: If I were a naturalist, I think I would try to argue that some transcendentals are contingent. I don’t think the argument would be very convincing, for the reasons I mentioned. After that, I think I would want to argue that metaphysical naturalism is necessary. Remember, it is not enough to simply say that metaphysical naturalism could be necessary. If all of the other premises of my argument are correct, and one wants to maintain metaphysical naturalism as true, one would have to admit that the only way it could be true is if it is metaphysically necessary. However, I don’t see any good reason to think metaphysical naturalism is metaphysically necessary for the reasons I’ve outlined above. So, it seems to me that, since “natural” is not a transcendental of “being”, metaphysical naturalism is false.
 Papineau, David, “Naturalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/>.
 This is based on an extensional definition of transcendentals offered by Jorge J.E. Gracia. See Jorge J.E. Gracia, 1992, “The Transcendentals in the Middle Ages: An Introduction,” Topoi 11(2): 113–120. Also Wouter Goris and Jan Aertsen, “Medieval Theories of Transcendentals”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/transcendentals-medieval/>
Reasonable Faith is putting out some well produced, clear, and concise presentations of classic arguments for God’s existence (as William Lane Craig typically develops those arguments). They are definitely worth a look:
The Kalam Cosmological Argument:
The Argument from Fine Tuning:
The Moral Argument:
It seems that Dr. Craig is putting together videos that defend each one of the arguments he favors for theism. If so, we should expect a video on the ontological argument, reformed epistemology, the historicity of the resurrection, and perhaps the applicability of mathematics to the universe (a sub-argument from fine-tuning). At least, I hope to see such videos in the future. If they come out, I’ll be sure to update the list.
While I don’t consider these videos to be scholarly level presentations that deal with the best objections to the arguments one might find in the literature, they are a good starting point. They are especially good if one is more of an auditory/visual learner.
I was particularly impressed by the analogy made in the Moral Argument video to explain the response to Euthyphro’s dilemma. Just to recall, Euthyphro’s dilemma, as it is often put by contemporary philosophers of religion, presents two untoward possibilities: either God commands the good because it is good, or God’s commands are good simply because they are commanded by God. If it is the former, the good exists independently from God, which not only means that God is not needed to explain objective moral values and duties, but also threatens God’s aseity. If it is the latter, then the good is arbitrary, since God could have commanded anything and it would be good because of that reason. In other words, God would have no standard or measure of moral goodness to consider when making His commands, they would simply issue forth and become good because of God’s authority. Murder, theft, and adultery could have been good if God chose to command them.
The response is to propose a third possibility, since the dilemma does not present perfectly dichotomous options. Classical theists want to argue that this third option is that God’s nature somehow is the Good. That is, God’s nature is the standard or measure by which moral values are measured and the commands issued by God are commands issued by the standard of Goodness itself.
The analogy that impressed me was to suggest that God’s nature relates to moral values and duties in the world in a similar way in which a live performance relates to a hi-fidelity recording. The closer the recording is to capturing the sound of the live performance, the better the recording is. The live audio is as good as can be. The recording cannot exceed that standard (without distorting it and not being faithful to the original). So God’s nature is the living presence of Goodness and all else is measured insofar as it is analogous to God in being good.
Aristotle begins his Metaphysics by saying something about human nature, “All men by nature desire to know” (Met. A, 980b22). If it is by our nature, we might be so bold as to count it among our essential properties. But, what does it mean to “desire”? And in particular, what does it mean to desire knowledge? Socrates provides the following account of “desire” in Plato’s Symposium:
Then this is what it is to love something which is not at hand, which the lover does not have: it is to desire the preservation of what he now has in time to come, so that he will have it then… So such a man or anyone else who has a desire desires what is not at hand and not present, what he does not have, and what he is not, and that of which he is in need; for such are the objects of desire and love… (Symposium 200d-e).
If this is so, to desire knowledge is to love something that is not at hand. It is to want and to keep knowledge. This also means that to have and to hold knowledge satisfies the desire for it. Such a situation is reflected in a quote that I saw posted on the blog of a friend and colleague. The quote is from an article by Lorraine Daston. The quote is as follows:
Therein lies the paradox of wonder: it is the beginning of inquiry (Descartes remarks that people deficient in wonder “are ordinarily quite ignorant”), but the end of inquiry also puts an end to wonder. The marvel that stopped us in our tracks—an aurora borealis, cognate words in languages separated by continents and centuries, the peacock’s tail—becomes only an apparent marvel once explained. Aesthetic appreciation may linger (it is no accident that the vernacular descendants of the Latin word for wonder, admiratio, convey esteem), but composure has returned. We are delighted but no longer discombobulated; what was once an earthquake of the soul is subdued into an agreeable frisson. At least within the classical philosophical tradition, from Aristotle to Descartes (and arguably beyond, to Adam Smith and even to Kant), this negative correlation between wonder and explanation is strong and tenacious. Explanation lies at the heart of the distinction between marvels and miracles in the Latin Christian tradition. What is the difference? Thomas Aquinas answers: marvels (mirabilia) are inexplicable to most but not all people (e.g. the eclipse that transfixes the ignorant peasant but not the learned astronomer); miracles (miracula) are inexplicable to everyone. Wonder is a barometer of ignorance: the learned experience it rarely; God, never. Wonder is not only a peculiarly human passion; it is also one that, at least on this account, underscores the limits of human knowledge. The more we know, the less we wonder.
Daston’s thesis is actually moves in quite the opposite. She holds that our understanding of “wonder” has evolved and adapted such that wonder is not snuffed out by knowledge, but is generated by knowledge. Not to disregard her thesis, but I do want to consider this more ancient notion of wonder for a moment. As Aristotle tells us that:
…it is owing to their wonder that men both now being and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end (Met. A, 982b11-22).
Now if naturalism is true, then the world may be filled with marvels, perhaps very inexplicable marvels like consciousness, but it is not filled with that which is, in principle, inexplicable for us. This does not mean that, on naturalism, reality could ever be fully disenchanted. There seems to be practical limitations that would prevent us from explaining everything. At the same time, it does mean that the relationship between reality and our minds is such that it is merely accidental that we have the desire to know. We could, in principle, uncover all of the marvels that exist and satisfy this desire. In snuffing it out, the desire would cease to exist in us. So actually having the desire for knowledge would be accidental if everything in existence were knowable for us. But, if the actuality of desiring knowledge is an essential feature of the human intellect, then there must be some sense in which, in principle, reality is not fully knowable or explicable. This would be true if there were true supernatural miracles and mysteries. The argument would be as follows:
1. All humans actually desire knowledge essentially. [Premise]
2. If naturalism is true, then the actuality of human desire for knowledge is accidental. [Premise]
3. If the actuality of human desire for knowledge is accidental, then it is not the case that all humans actually desire knowledge essentially. [Premise]
4. Therefore, it is not the case that naturalism is true.
Now there are a few ways the naturalist could object:
Objection 1: Though naturalism is true, there are some natural mysteries that are unknowable, intractable, or inexplicable in principle. For instance, we may not be able to know or understand why there is something rather than nothing. We might not be able to know if there is a multiverse, or what occurred before the big bang. We might not be able to explain consciousness. We might not be able to fully explain those soft sciences that involve human behavior (owing to human freedom, or chaos, or indeterminism).
Reply to 1: It seems to me that if there are per se mysterious features of reality, there is no reason to be a naturalist. I take naturalism to be the claim that all of reality can be accounted for by the natural sciences. If certain aspects of reality are not merely really difficult to account for by natural scientific methodology, but intrinsically and essentially beyond the scope of the natural sciences, then I would say that metaphysical naturalism is a failure (or just a vacuous metaphysical position).
Objection 2: One could bite the bullet and say that humans don’t actually desire knowledge in an essential way. It is merely an accidental property of our mental constitution. Perhaps the capacity to desire knowledge is essential to humans, but not the actuality.
Reply to 2: This seems like a more powerful objection than the first. Humans satisfy desires all the time. In fact, there is a famous argument from desire put forth by C.S. Lewis, which argues that all natural desires have an object in reality that can satisfy their desires. So it might seem that the existence of the humanly unknowable or inexplicable contradicts this premise. However, the argument from desire does not hold that all desires are satisfied. The hungry child who is a victim of famine may never get the food that satisfies her, though such food exists. There may be knowledge that exists, say in the mind of an omniscient God, that we desire, but can never possess (due to our natural limitations). So the fact that we cannot completely satisfy our desire for knowledge, and that all natural desires have corresponding objects, does not mean that there is nothing to know when it comes to the truly miraculous or mysterious.
Now one might say that nothing really is truly miraculous or mysterious. We can, in principle, explain everything naturally, we are just limited by time and other pressing needs. And one might even be willing to grant that humans possess the capacity to desire wisdom in an essential way (the potential/power to desire knowledge), but that capacity can be fulfilled in the following way: we actually desire knowledge when we are actually ignorant and potentially in a state of knowledge. When we change to a state of potentially desiring knowledge, we are actually in a state of knowledge and are potentially ignorant. We could, in principle, be in a state of potentially desiring all knowledge, if we can be in a state of actually knowing all things (potentially ignorant). So this objection amounts to the claim that we humans have the capacity for omniscience essentially (perhaps as a collective and through various mediums of storing knowledge).
I find this response too strong. I don’t think any naturalist would want to hold it either. Ultimately, I think the idea that humans will always be in some actual state of desire for knowledge rests on a certain intuition about the relationship between the human capacity for knowledge and the way reality is. My intuition is that not everything can be known by us. And this, to me, stands in the way of metaphysical naturalism. For what else is the naturalist claiming than that reality falls completely under the genus “natural”. And so reality can be completely defined and comprehended by our intellects. If this is not the naturalist’s claim, then I am not sure what naturalism is supposed to be (at times I suspect it really is just the denial of souls and God, but that is not a positive metaphysical position).
One might point out that we don’t always actually desire knowledge (small babies, the sleeping, etc.). Furthermore, some desire knowledge more than others. Doesn’t this indicate that, while the capacity to desire knowledge may be essential, the actuality of that desire can change and is accidental to our circumstances and personal dispositions. A response might be to consider Aristotle’s musical man. In a sense, one can argue that all humans, sleeping, and even the very young, have a natural desire to know is a first actuality insofar as one has an intellect that is always deprived of knowledge that it desires to have. The second actuality might be something like the active awareness of that desire, which motivates one’s investigations. Even the very young explore their world with their eyes, hands, and mouth. So, I don’t think it is the case that even the very young escape this state.
[H/T: Tim McGrew] A play adapted from Peter Kreeft’s Socrates Meets Jesus. The performance takes place at my alma mater, Assumption College.
This was all over my Facebook feed. Pretty funny!
The WordPress.com stats helper monkeys prepared a 2014 annual report for this blog.
Here’s an excerpt:
A New York City subway train holds 1,200 people. This blog was viewed about 5,500 times in 2014. If it were a NYC subway train, it would take about 5 trips to carry that many people.
What is information? Information expresses something. It is intentional and so not random, right? A Youtube collaboration between VSauce and Veritasium presents an interesting argument that information is random, or rather, entropy:
But is that right? Information is random? If so, wouldn’t it be unintelligible?
When transmitting information, you can compress all that which is a pattern or predictable. This means that whatever cannot be reduced or compressed is pure information. At the same time, pure information without pattern and order is meaningless. It is just white noise. So it seems that intelligibility is not the same thing as information, at least when it is defined as entropy (as it is in this information theory). Meaning emerges from patterns of information. The random must be ordered and patterned in ways that we can decode and understand. So intelligibility or meaning is the confluence of information and order.
The video makes the neat point that our scientific theories are really just attempts to compress the information we find in nature. It is interesting to note that scientists often prefer theories and equations that are described as “elegant” or “beautiful”. In certain sense, the idea that intelligibility, or meaning, emerges from patterns of random information can help us to understand why we find these compressions beautiful.
In an earlier post, I had defended the beauty of the Trinitarian God over unitarian gods on the grounds that the Trinity has both unity and distinction, i.e. a simple unified divine substance that is three distinct persons. I argued that we can objectively define that which is beautiful as that which is unified, harmonious, and ordered while admitting distinctions.
If information is maxim entropy, it contains an irreducible unity. That unity of information becomes intelligible when it is ordered into patterns and brought into harmony with other bits of information. It becomes meaningful. So whatever is intelligible is inherently beautiful. Thus, there may be something metaphysical underlying the idea that a scientifically true formula or equation is objectively “elegant” or “beautiful”. We find that it is “elegant” or “beautiful” because it is a simple unity, yet it has the power to explain a wide variety of our data by revealing patterns. The more unified and simple an equation is, and the greater amount of distinct phenomena it captures, the more beautiful it is. This also hints at the fundamental unity between objective truth and beauty, which I believe we find in nature as a reflection of what is fundamental to the Godhead.
How is this fundamental to the Godhead? If God is Being itself, or Being must truly, then God must be perfect, simple, and irreducible. Whatever is perfect in Being must be truly Good, and indeed, the Father is Good. Goodness is opposed to ignorance, as ignorance is a source of evil, so if the Father is Good, he must know His own Nature, and so must be thought thinking itself. Since the Divine Substance is absolutely simple, the Father cannot abstract a genus or species to comprehend His Nature propositionally. Instead, He must comprehend or grasp the Divine Nature Itself in a concrete way, or else He grasps nothing. And in doing this, conceives of the Divine Substance distinctly from the One who is conceiving. If God’s knowledge is accurate, he must conceive of the same exact concrete Substance that He is. So his eternal conception of the Divine Substance is the same substance that He is, it is the grasp of the Truth of God’s Goodness. And we call this eternal conception, or this eternally begotten grasp of the Divine Substance, the Son, who is the Truth itself. As the Father knows the Divine Substance, the Divine Substance is essentially intelligible to the Father. There is a distinction between knower and known and a pattern of sameness that makes the Divine Substance knowable to itself. Thus, Beauty is intrinsic to Divine Substance in its self-intelligibility. Since Beauty is that which is desirable in itself, the Will of God is directed towards the Divine Substance. So another relationship exists between God’s Will and the Divine Substance, which is desirable because of the intrinsic beauty of the Divine Substance as a Self-Intelligible unity. So the Divine Substance, which is the object of the Divine Will, proceeds from the Father (as Knower) and the Son (as Known), and must be distinct from these Two. We call the object of the Divine Will, which is God, the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is true Beauty. And so there is a Trinity of Persons that is the Godhead.
If the Divine Substance is Being itself, it is also the representative of the transcendentals of Being: Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. Interestingly, those three transcendentals are convertible with Being but remain distinct from one another. So we find that the Persons of the Trinity are convertible with God, but are distinct from one another. This is not to say that the Son is not Good or Beautiful, or that the Holy Spirit is not True or Good. Rather, I am saying that the Persons of the Trinity relate to one another in terms of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. But they are far more than these transcendentals. I think it is a helpful way of understanding the relationships among the Persons in the ontological structure of their relationships (unbeggotten, begotten, and proceeding). The relationship among the Persons of the Trinity and the Divine Substance is ultimately mysterious, but an analogy to the trinity of transcendentals is a helpful image to have in mind.
Of course, whenever I reflect on the Trinity, I fear that I might stumble into heresy. Nonetheless, I am drawn to thinking about it, like a moth to the flame. How could I not? There is nothing more mysterious, more beautiful, and more true. So, if my comments are in error, I humbly submit them as a mere reflection that is subject to revision.
Official Catholic accounts state that on the morning of December 9, 1531, Juan Diego saw an apparition of a maiden at the Hill of Tepeyac, in what would become the town of Villa de Guadalupe in the suburbs of Mexico City. Speaking to him in the native Nahuatl language, the maiden asked that a church be built at that site in her honor; from her words, Juan Diego recognized the maiden as the Virgin Mary. Diego recounted the events to the Archbishop of Mexico City, Fray Juan de Zumárraga, who instructed him to return to Tepeyac Hill, and ask the “lady” for a miraculous sign to prove her identity. The first sign was the Virgin healing Juan’s uncle. The Virgin told Juan Diego to gather flowers from the top of Tepeyac Hill, where he found Castilian roses, not native to Mexico, blooming in December on the normally barren hilltop. The Virgin arranged the flowers in his tilma or cloak, and when Juan Diego opened his cloak before Bishop Zumárraga on December 12, the flowers fell to the floor, and on the fabric was the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe (Our Lady of Guadalupe, Wikipedia).
In honor of Our Lady, I thought I would share a reflection on the Holy Mother of the Church that occurred to me while I was researching for my post on Richard Carrier and γίνομαι. According to Carrier, St. Paul never believed that Christ lived a human life on Earth. Rather, Carrier claims that St. Paul worshiped a celestial Jesus. Two passages often cited against this view are Romans 1:3 and Galatians 4:4, as both claim that Christ was of human birth rather than direct divine manufacture. Particularly relevant to the Blessed Virgin is the passage from Galatians, which says:
But when the fullness of the time came, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born under the Law… (Galatians 4:4, NASV).
Carrier counters that the woman in this passage must be taken allegorically, because Paul says:
Tell me, you who want to be under law, do you not listen to the law? For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by the bondwoman and one by the free woman. But the son by the bondwoman was born according to the flesh, and the son by the free woman through the promise. This is allegorically speaking, for these women are two covenants: one proceeding from Mount Sinai bearing children who are to be slaves; she is Hagar. Now this Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia and corresponds to the present Jerusalem, for she is in slavery with her children. But the Jerusalem above is free; she is our mother (Galatians 4:21-26).
Carrier argues that the woman in Galatians 4:4 should be taken allegorically because the women in Galatians 4:24 (Hagar and Sarah) are taken allegorically to represent two covenants. Rather, I think that St. Paul is drawing out an allegory from the literal and historical human birth of Christ to the Blessed Virgin. Sarah is a typological pre-figuring of Mary. Sarah’s miraculous conception and birth is the first fruits of God’s covenant with Abraham, a covenant that through the offspring of Isaac, all nations will be blessed (Genesis 22:15-18). This covenant culminates in a second, greater, miraculous conception, which is the fulfillment of God’s covenant with Abraham to bless all nations of people. However, if Christ is not truly an offspring of the line of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, St. Paul would not think that this covenant was truly fulfilled. Thus, the woman in Galatians 4:4 should be understood to be a real flesh and blood mother, if Christ is to be the fulfillment of God’s promise to Abraham. So, St.Paul takes a literal event, Christ’s birth to a woman, and ties it to Genesis 17, where he promises that Sarah will give birth to a child.
The beauty of the Catholic understanding of scripture is often “both…and” rather than “either…or”. Carrier wants the woman in Galatians 4:4 to be allegorical rather than literal. The Catholic response is not to say that she is literal rather than allegorical, but that she is both a literal mother and an allegorical mother. Mary is, allegorically, the Mother of the New Covenant. We see, particularly in the Gospel of Luke, to how Mary is likened to the Ark of the Covenant. She is the Ark of the New Covenant.
On this day, we should remember that St. Paul tells us that the woman allegorically represents the covenant. As the Son of God took on flesh and was born of a woman, we are adopted as sons and daughters of the same covenant (see Galatians 4:5). This means that the woman adopts us, and we are her children, which is precisely the point St. Paul draws from the allegory:
So then, brethren, we are not children of a bondwoman, but of the free woman (Galatians 4:31, NASV).
As we are children of the free woman, she is our mother (see Galatians 4:26). Thus, the Holy Catholic Church is quite correct to confer the title Mater Ecclesiae, Mother of the Church, upon the Blessed Virgin Mary. For, she is the Mother of the Universal Church. We see this in the scriptures amidst the most important event in all of human history. During the crucifixion of Christ, He turns to the Beloved Apostle, John, and says:
…“Behold, your mother!” (John 19:27).
Christ adopts St. John the Evangelist as His brother in the last moments before His death. And John took Mary into his household as his mother from that moment. So we too should take Mary into our household as our mother. Today, we honor Mary the Mother of God, as it is through her offspring that all nations, including the nations indigenous to the Americas, were, and are, blessed. The Covenant to God extends out from the tribes of Israel to all tribes and nations of the Earth. And so she appeared to her children in Mexico in 1531. When they saw her, they knew she was their mother.
Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, ruega por nosotros.
Ex-apologist presents an interesting argument against a form of classical theism that includes a classical view of creation: classical theismcvc (click here to read the original article). The argument is based on what he calls the principle of material causality, or PMC, which features in the first premise of his argument. The second premise states an implication of classical theismcvc and shows that one cannot hold to the PMC and to classical theismcvc at the same time, i.e. the two are inconsistent. Since one has good reason to hold to the PMC, classical theismcvc must be abandoned, so the argument goes. Ex-apologists formulates it this way:
1. All concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining cause have a material cause of their existence.
2. If classical theismcvc is true, then the universe is a concrete object that has an originating or sustaining cause without a material cause of its existence.
3. Therefore, classical theismcvc is false. 
The argument is essentially valid, so the question of soundness comes down to the truth of the premises. In this critique, I will explore the notion of the principle of material causality, PMC, and show why, with a more precise notion of PMC in place, the argument cannot be successful. But first we must understand what ex-apologist means by a few of his terms.
Classical Theism: “…the view that there is a personal god who is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.”
The Classical View of Creation: “the view that consists in the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from the natural world; (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo.”
Originating cause: “…an efficient cause of the temporal beginning of a thing’s existence…”
Sustaining cause: “…an efficient cause of a thing’s continued existence.”
Matter cause: “…the things or stuff from which another thing is made…” [Note: Ex-apologist’s (1), his PMC, is restricted to concrete objects that have either a sustaining or originating cause. So no question is begged against God, since God is typically held to be uncaused. Also, though it is not explicitly stated, I take creation ex nihilo to be defined as the causation of something without pre-existing matter]
First, something more should be said about what “universe” means, so as to avoid equivocation. With contemporary talk of multiverses, the word “universe” has been relegated to mean this particular spatio-temporal expanse. There may be parent universes that have generated our own universe along with countless sister universes. Of course, classical theismcvc claims that God has created and sustains the whole natural world, which would include the multiverse and any other natural thing beyond or outside of that. So the argument should avoid talk of the universe and instead just speak of the “natural world” as that which includes the totality of nature, whatever that was, is, or may be.
Ex-apologist uses a disjunction to say that God is the originating OR sustaining cause of the natural world. Now, some theists might object and say that God is both the originating AND the sustaining cause of the natural world. However, I think he is quite right to insist upon the disjunction. The idea of a “first cause” is not necessarily the same as an “originating cause”, which implies that the effect has a temporal beginning or begins to exist. When, for instance, Aquinas calls God the “first cause,” he does not mean to imply that God preceded the existence of the universe in time. In fact, as an Aristotelian, he thought that the best science of his day indicated that the universe could very well be past eternal (see SCG II.33 and SCG II.38). Instead of thinking that God is temporally first in efficient causal priority, Aquinas thought God, who transcends time altogether, had priority or primacy as a causal explanation of everything, i.e. there is nothing beyond or beside God in the causal series out of which the universe is created. This is not to say that God can use secondary causes, but they are not “beside” God in the sense that they are uncaused and per se necessary. God is pure actuality, and He explains the actuality of all other things. I suspect that this is why ex-apologist is making use of the disjunction “originating or sustaining cause.” For, the universe need not be finite in the past for classical theismcvc to be true, and historically speaking, many proponents of classical theismcvc explicitly embraced the possibility that the natural world or cosmos lacked an originating cause.
Let us consider the principle of material causation more closely and whether it is genuinely inconsistent with creation ex nihilo. Now, as I have said, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is the claim that God caused the natural world without using pre-existing matter. But this does not mean that the natural world lacks material causality at any moment when it exists. Suppose there were a possible world where God creates, ex nihilo, a singular bronze sphere. Would the principle of material causation hold for this sphere? Yes. The sphere is materially caused by the bronze from which it is composed. The Aristotelian would not say that the sphere lacks a material cause merely because it wasn’t created from pre-existing bronze, or pre-existing copper and tin. Rather, the Aristotelian would say that a material cause did not precede the effect in time. That is, God did not use bronze or the components of bronze that existed prior to His willing the brazen sphere’s existence. In fact, even if the sphere were eternal, we could say that God creates the brazen sphere from no pre-existing matter even though bronze is the matter that “sustains” the sphere in existence as a secondary cause. Thus the brazen sphere is created ex nihilo and has a material cause. Likewise, the natural world could have a material cause at any moment it exists while not coming to be from pre-existing matter.
So what is going on here? How can some object be created ex nihilo and have a material cause? We need to make a parallel distinction to the one we find in efficient causality between originating and sustaining such that there can be an originating material cause for a thing and a sustaining material cause. We can define an originating material cause as the pre-existing matter out of which a concrete object begins to exist (e.g. the unformed bronze, or copper and tin). We can define a sustaining material cause as the matter that composes concrete object at all times that the concrete object continues to exist (e.g. the bronze currently in the sphere while it is existing). As the sphere and the bronze from which it is composed simultaneously exist as an effect of God’s will, the brazen sphere exists ex nihilo, from no pre-existing matter. Now, one might object by saying that this is not “creation” since creation must involve motion or change out of which something comes to be. This would be contrary, however, to what Aquinas argues in, for instance, the Summa Contra Gentiles II.17 where he specifically denies that creation involves motion or change. For Aquinas, genuine creation is not merely changing one thing into another, but the very actualization of substance itself. Creation is just what one calls the relationship between the first cause, God, and his effects, i.e. the creation of non-divine substance. Anything actualized by God, i.e. the being of pure actuality, is a created thing. So, for Aquinas, creation ex nihilo merely follows from the notion that God is the uncaused cause of all other things. It should also be noted that matter, the underlying stuff, is always a composite of act and potency. Consequently, on the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical view, there simply cannot be uncaused or uncreated matter that co-exists with God from which other things are made. For such matter would have to receive its actuality from another, and so it must have a caused if it exists—a cause that will somehow trace back to the Being of Pure Actuality. Admittedly this is the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of matter, and perhaps ex-apologist would like to distance himself from such an understanding of matter towards a more modern notion of matter as pure extended stuff. Perhaps pure extension can exist uncaused along with God. It is less clear whether standard particle theory, which seems to comport better with hylomorphism than early modern notions of matter, can be uncaused or self-actualizing. Either way, I think more needs to be said about what matter actually is.
Now consider ex-apologist’s argument and the disjunctions involved therein. Those disjunctions will prove important to this discussion. We may grant that a concrete object that has an originating OR sustaining [efficient] cause has a material cause, but for ex-apologist’s argument to work, there must always be an originating material cause. Otherwise, one might escape his argument through the following formulation, PCM’:
(4) All concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining efficient cause have an originating or sustaining material cause of their existence.
This reformulation will not force the falsity of classical theismcvc because it need not be the case that the universe has an originating material case. So:
(5) If classical theismcvc is true, then the natural world is a concrete object that has an originating or sustaining efficient cause and not an originating material cause of its existence.
(6) Therefore, if classical theismcvc is true, the natural world has a sustaining material cause of its existence.
Many classical theists will want to reject the notion that all of creation is material, but the thesis isn’t explicitly contrary to classical theismcvc, as ex-apologist defines it. So, the conclusion is consistent with classical theismcvc. To avoid this escape, ex-apologist will have to say that all concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining efficient cause, must have an originating material cause of their existence. This means that he must have an even stronger PMC’’ which states:
(7) All concrete objects that have an originating or sustaining efficient cause have an originating material cause of their existence.
From this, he can argue:
(8) If classical theismcvc is true, then the natural world is a concrete object that has an originating or sustaining efficient cause and not an originating material cause of its existence.
(9) Therefore, classical theismcvc is false.
Now PMC’’, as found in (7), seems a bit odd in that it maintains the disjunction with respect to efficient causality as though something could have an originating material cause (be composed from pre-existing unformed matter) simply because it has a sustaining efficient cause. Return to our possible world of the brazen sphere for a moment. Suppose God, or some other efficient cause, sustained the matter in the appropriate configuration for all eternity. Such a sphere would have a sustaining efficient cause but no originating material out of which the composite concrete object comes to be. This scenario has, at least, prima facie plausibility. So I see no good reason to suppose that a sufficient condition of having originating matter is for a concrete object to have a sustaining efficient cause. If something is eternal and sustained in existence (i.e. it has a sustaining efficient cause and no originating efficient cause), there is no good reason to think it came to be from pre-existing matter, and there is good reason to think that it would be incoherent to suppose it could have an originating material cause. Given that, (7) appears to be a false principle, and we should clarify our principle of material causality once again to PMC’’’:
10) All concrete objects that have an originating efficient cause have an originating material cause of their existence.
From here, one could argue:
11) If classical theismcvc is true, then the natural world is a concrete object that has an originating efficient cause and not an originating material cause of its existence.
(12) Therefore, classical theismcvc is false.
The problem, of course, is that (11) is too strong. Classical theism does not depend upon there being an originating efficient cause of the universe, just that there must be a first cause in order of explanation that could be either originating or sustaining. The universe need not have a temporal beginning at all. So it seems to me that ex-apologist needs argue, independently of whatever classical theismcvc may imply about the natural world, to say that it indeed has originating causes:
(13) All concrete objects that have an originating efficient cause have an originating material cause of their existence.
(14) The natural world has an originating efficient cause.
(15) If classical theismcvc is true, then the natural world does not have an originating material cause of its existence.
(16) Therefore, classical theismcvc is false.
Now what could be said of this argument? One might object to (13). Ex-apologist anticipates a rejection of his PMC via quantum mechanics or libertarian free will. I am not certain that his discussion is successful with respect to libertarian freewill, since he suggests that since an agent’s free will is caused by energy from outside of the natural causal order, freely willed choice is not genuinely caused ex nihilo. According to ex-apologist, the story would be that energy from outside the natural causal order was part of the causal explanation of the will, and so the choice would not be genuinely ex nihilo. It’s not clear to me that such an event would not be ex nihilo because of some supernatural energy. I am not sure what this energy would be, but it is not clear that it is equivalent to or convertible with matter in any sense of the term, or that a free will choice is somehow composed from this pre-existing supernatural energy. And it seems to me that if this point is pushed too hard, determinism threatens. For if this supernatural energy is the something like the “pre-existing matter” out of which an agent’s choices emerges, then even if our choices are inexplicable within the natural causal order (since it is not closed), it may be explicable and determined within the supernatural causal order and determined there within. The libertarian must maintain that alternative choice is possible, and so whatever this supernatural energy is, it cannot be determining things in the way pre-existing matter/energy determines things within the natural causal order. So it is a disanalogous energy.
I would think that a more straightforward defeater for (13) would be the creation of immaterial souls or intellects. There are plausible arguments for the immateriality of the soul or part of the soul, and those arguments would have to be addressed by ex-apologist if his argument is to have any merit. My personal favorite is James Ross’s argument for the immateriality of thought (which I have blogged about here), though there are many other such arguments. Ross says that physical and material process are indeterminate, and so do not perfectly align with truth-preserving determinate processes such as we find in the intellect’s formal and deductive rational processes. He concludes that these intellectual processes cannot be material processes. If so, these processes are concrete and also have originating efficient causes in the agent. Insofar as they are immaterial, they lack a material cause in their origination, and they are not sustained by matter. Rather, hylomorphicists, like me, argue that the originating causes are formal and efficient rather than material.
With respect to (14), ex-apologist will have to sustain an enormous burden of proof. For this is not merely the claim that the universe began to exist at some finite point in the past, but that the whole of nature, itself, is a concrete object that began to exist at some point, and so came from pre-existing matter. What’s more, if the totality of nature was composed from pre-existing matter, then that matter would have to be, by definition, beyond that which is within the scope of the natural world, and so would be supernatural. This is, of course, problematic for any sensible definition of “natural” since matter has always been taken to be a prime example of that which is natural. Of course we need to pin down what “natural” and “material” mean to consider whether it is even coherent to talk about supernatural matter. Moreover, natural material things would have to be ultimately composed out of whatever this supernatural matter is. And since other things begin to exist out of this matter, all concreta that begins to exist would have to be ultimately composed out of this supernatural stuff. Also, there would have to be a supernatural efficient cause of the universe, to maintain this argument—some sort of demiurge. This is a very untoward consequence of attempting to sustain (13) and (14), as it would be a defeater for naturalism as much as it would be a defeater for classical theismcvc. In other words, in using (13)-(15) to defeat classical theismcvc, one is, in effect, arguing in favor of the sort of cosmogony one finds in Plato’s Timaeus. I doubt that ex-apologist wants to defend the notion that there is a demiurge who fashions the natural world out of supernatural matter.
Summary: many classical theists would reject (13) on the grounds that the soul or part of the soul begins to exist, but lacks a material cause. Those arguments should not be ignored. Furthermore, classical theismcvc is neutral with respect to (14), so it is a premise that ex-apologist would need to justify independently. The ultimate problem is that (13) and (14), taken together, would undercut naturalism as much as classical theismcvc and lead to the absurd conclusion that the natural world is made out of some spooky supernatural “stuff”. I doubt any naturalist would want to defend (14) on its own merits, and it would be unfair to saddle the classical theist with defending (14), though there are some theists who seem keen on the idea of a finite past (I’m looking at you, Dr. Craig). It is for these reasons that I do not think a successful argument against classical theism from material causality can be had.
Ultimately the PMC is not incompatible with creation ex nihilo. At best, creation ex nihilo is incompatible with the notion that all concreta which has an originating efficient cause has an originating material cause, but only if it is assumed that the natural world has an originating efficient cause. Does the natural world have an originating cause? I’m not sure we can know. If it does have one, I am not sure that it is so much better to posit that it came to be from a demiurge and supernatural matter than from God ex nihilo.
 All quotes taken from Ex-apologist (2014, December, 04) “Theism and Material Causality”. Retrieved from http://exapologist.blogspot.com.es/2014/12/theism-and-material-causality.html