That an Omnipotent Individual Exists
Here is an argument that an omnipotent individual exists:
P1) All potentialities are things, or states of affairs, that can be realized by an actually existing individual or an actually existing mereological sum.
P2) All metaphysical possibilities are potentialities.
C1) All metaphysical possibilities are things, or states of affairs, that can be realized by an actually existing individual or an actually existing mereological sum (P1,P2 Modus Barbara).
P3) If all metaphysical possibilities are things, or states of affairs, that can be realized by an actually existing individual or an actually existing mereological sum, then some individual is an omnipotent being or some mereological sum is an omnipotent being.
C2) Some individual is an omnipotent being or some mereological sum is an omnipotent being. (C1,P3 Modus Ponens).
P4) No thing that is contingent is an omnipotent being.
P5) All mereological sums are things that are contingent.
C3) No mereological sum is an omnipotent being (P4,P5 Modus Celarent).
C4) It is not the case that some mereological sum is an omnipotent being (C3 Contradiction).
C5) Some individual is an omnipotent being (C2,C4 Disjunctive Syllogism).
C6) There is an individual that is an omnipotent being (C5 Semantic Equivalence).
Defense of premises:
Support for P1: This is a statement of actualism, the metaphysical thesis that anything that is potentially real must be grounded in something that is actually real. That is, potentials are the powers that actualities possess.
Support for P2: Here, I defend this implication as following from the definition of what a metaphysical possibility is, namely, a real potential that can be actualized. That is, these are genuine possibilities, and not mere epistemic possibilities, and so are properly potentially real things, or states of affairs.
Support for P3: The implication, here, is that there is either an individual or set of things that is the actuality by which all potentials can be realized. That is, if all potentials can be realized by something actual, then that actuality, be it individually or collectively, is omnipotent. This is the definition of omnipotence. Note that this premises is neutral on the question of whether the set of “all metaphysical possibilities” is finite or infinite. However, to be omnipotent, it is sufficient that one has the power to actualize all of the metaphysical possibilities there are. It need not be established that the set is infinite, though I suspect it is. To be omnipotent, one must possess the ability to actualize all of the metaphysical possibilities that there are.
Support for P4: A thing that is contingent is not the source of its own existence, and therefore cannot be the actuality by which its own existence obtains. The potential for a contingent thing to exist must exist in some other actuality beyond itself.
Support for P5: A mereological sum is a collection of things that, grouped together, compose some whole. All collections of things are contingent on their parts, and the arrangement or structure by which those parts really compose a whole, just as a human is contingent upon the atoms which compose his body.