Improving the Formulation of Bonaventure’s OA

The following formulation relies on one less premise than my previous formulation, and avoids the implication that there are not objects which refer to God and which are not completely God, i.e. that there are not objects of thought to which “God” refers (a problem that resulted from the way I formulated P2 in the earlier version).

D1) God is absolutely complete
P1) If no objects to which “God” refers  are objects that truly and completely possess the divine essence, then God is not absolutely complete.
P2) If there is an object to which “God” refers and it truly and completely has the divine essence, then God exists in reality.
C) God exists in reality

Let,

Cx ≝ x is absolutely complete
Dx ≝ x truly and completely has the divine essence
Rxy ≝ x is the entity to which “y” refers
E!x ≝ x exists in reality
g ≝ (ɿx)Cx

1. (∀x)(Rxg → ~Dx) → ~Cg (premise)
2. (∃x)(Rxg ∧ Dx) → E!g (premise)
3. (∀x)(Rxg → ~Dx) (IP)
4. ~Cg (1,3 MP)
5. (∃x)[Cx ∧ (∀y){[Cy →(y = x)] ∧ ~Cx} (4 theory of descriptions)
6. [Cμ ∧ (∀y){[Cy →(y = μ)] ∧ ~Cμ (5 EI)
7. [(∀y){[Cy →(y = μ) ∧ Cμ] ∧ ~Cμ (6 Comm)
8. (∀y){[Cy →(y = μ) ∧ [Cμ ∧ ~Cμ] (7 Assoc)
9. Cμ ∧ ~Cμ (8 Simp)
10. ~(∀x)(Rxg → ~Dx) (3-9 IP)
11. ~(∀x)(~Rxg ∨ ~Dx)(10 Impl)
12. ~(∀x)~(Rxg ∧ Dx)(11 DeM)
13. (∃x)~~(Rxg ∧ Dx) (12 QN)
14. (∃x)(Rxg ∧ Dx) (13 DN)
15. E!g (2,14 MP)

QED

Posted on July 25, 2019, in Arguments for God and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink. 1 Comment.

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