An Ontological Argument Using Aristotelian Logic

The following argument should receive an Aristotelian interpretation for existential import, but neutral on the question of whether one is discussing fictional or non-fictional existence. This is in-line with the Anselmian point that the question isn’t whether God exists, but the mode of God’s existence, i..e in reality or in the understanding alone:

1) All fictional beings are things of which a greater can be conceived (premise).

2) No being that is identical to the being than which none greater can be conceived is a thing of which a greater can be conceived (premise).

3) No being that is identical to the being than which none greater can be conceived is a fictional being (from 1,2 by Modus Camestres).

4) Some beings that are identical to the being than which none greater can be conceived are not fiction beings (from 3 by Sub-Alternation).

5) Some beings that are identical to the being than which none greater can be conceived are non-fictional beings (from 4 by Obversion).

6) There is some x, such that x is identical to the being than which none greater can be conceived and x is non-fictional (from 5 by Semantic Equivalence).

QED