Category Archives: Arguments for God

The BOA with an Actuality Operator “@”

[Note: The following exploration of the Bonavaenturean Ontological Argument (hereafter, the BOA) uses Free Logic and an “actuality” operator.]

Expressed informally

D1) God is the absolutely complete being.
P1) If nothing that satisfies the definite description of God is actually absolutely complete, then God is not absolutely complete.
P2) If something that satisfied the definite description of God is actually absolutely complete, then God exists in reality.
C) God exists in reality

Explanation of D1: Here we stipulate that God is defined as complete in every positive simple attribute, which is to say that by “God”, we mean a perfect being. Given free logic, singular terms that are provided with a definite description do not carry existential import. Maydole (2009, “Ontological Arguments”, Blackwell Companion, 555) explains:

The presupposition is that some referring singular terms and definite descriptions could be free of existential import, and quantifiers should be allowed to range over possibilia (Girle 2003, chap. 4). Otherwise, some referential terms that refer to nonmental things, such as “God” and “the being than which nothing greater can be conceived,” would have to refer to mental things that have existence-in-the-understanding, which makes no sense; or those referential terms would have to have to refer to things that have existence in-reality, which would make the Anselmian ontological argument beg the question.

Maydole’s point with respect to the Anselmian ontological argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to the BOA. This definitions is definite, i.e. it refers to a singular term. Since absolute completeness implies omnipotence, and there can only be one omnipotent being. For, if there were two, one could will contrary to the other, and absurdity would follow, e.g. one wills that at time t1 a surface is entirely red, and another omnipotent being that at time t1 a surface is entirely green.

A stipulation is to be granted, so long as it is coherent, otherwise any conclusion could be deduced from it. As to whether the definition of an absolutely complete being is coherent, it should be noted that perfections, in being both simple and positive, cannot contain any explicit or implicit contradiction, and so the stipulation is logically coherent. For to have a contradiction, one perfection would have to negate the other, either in whole or in part. But for a whole perfection to negate another, the perfection would have to be a negative attribute. And for a part of perfection to negate another perfection, the perfection would have to be complex rather than simple. So perfections are compossible, and the definition coherent. This is based on the Leibnizian argument for the compossibility of perfections.  So here we have a non-question-begging, coherent, definite description.

Defense of P1: The key to defending this premise is to understand how “actually” functions in the argument. In the context of this argument “actually” means that it is the case in our reality. This could be thought in contrast to “imaginably”. For instance, we might say, simply, that Sherlock Holmes is the world’s greatest detective. In one sense, this is true, in that it can be imagined that Sherlock Holmes is the world’s greatest detective. In actuality, though, Sherlock Holmes is not the world’s greatest detective, so it is not completely true that Sherlock Holmes is the world’s greatest detective. That is, “Sherlock Holmes is the world’s greatest detective” is an incomplete expression. The principle behind this premise, then, is the idea that if something is not actually the case, then to say it is the case, simply, is not completely true. Applied, then, to the denial that a thing is actually absolutely complete, and we must infer that it is not completely true that it is absolutely complete. But to deny the complete truth that something is absolutely complete just is to deny that it is absolutely complete.

Defense of P2: This is, of course, not to claim God exists in reality, but is to provide a sufficient condition by which it could be said that God exists in reality. That condition is for an individual to exemplify the perfections of absolute completeness in reality

The Formal Proof

Let,

@… ≝ it is actually the case that…
Cx ≝ x is absolutely complete
Dxy ≝ x is the individual by which y is definitionally described
E!x ≝ x exists in reality
g ≝ (ɿx)Cx

1. (∀x)(Dxg → ~@Cx) → ~Cg (premise)
2. (∃x)(Dxg ∧ @Cx) → E!g (premise)
3. (∀x)(Dxg → ~@Cx) (IP)
4. ~Cg (1,3 MP)
5. (∃x)[Cx ∧ (∀y){[Cy →(y = x)] ∧ ~Cx} (4 theory of descriptions)
6. [Cμ ∧ (∀y){[Cy →(y = μ)] ∧ ~Cμ (5 EI)
7. [(∀y){[Cy →(y = μ) ∧ Cμ] ∧ ~Cμ (6 Comm)
8. (∀y){[Cy →(y = μ) ∧ [Cμ ∧ ~Cμ] (7 Assoc)
9. Cμ ∧ ~Cμ (8 Simp)
10. ~(∀x)(Dxg → ~@Cx) (3-9 IP)
11. ~(∀x)(~Dxg ∨ ~@Cx)(10 Impl)
12. ~(∀x)~(Dxg ∧ @Cx)(11 DeM)
13. (∃x)~~(Dxg ∧ @Cx) (12 QN)
14. (∃x)(Dxg ∧ @Cx) (13 DN)
15. E!g (2,14 MP)

QED

Hope and the MOA

As I have argued elsewhere, hope is a habit of the will by which one desires a good and expects to receive it.  As in many virtues, hope is a mean between extremes, as one can desire a good in a disordered way (too much or too little in relation to other things good or bad), and ones expectations can be too high or too low depending on what is reasonable to expect.  Hope, then, involves achieving a mean in both what one desires and what one expects, which shows that there is a certain state of character that admits of a mean between extremes that tends towards our good.

Thus, if we can virtuously hope for p, we can rationally expect that p.  Moreover, it can be argued that if we are ignorant as to whether p is even metaphysically possible, we cannot rationally evaluate whether we ought to expect that p is true.  Now, I could contend that a person can virtuously hope for a perfect being, i.e. a being that has all perfections, including necessary existence.  If this is so, a perfect being exists.

Some atheists may endorse the virtue of hoping that there is a perfect being, but then they must either claim that one can virtuously hope for that which is inscrutable in terms of expectations (and so deny that such a mean is part of virtue), or they must hold that one can reasonably expect there to be a perfect being without knowing whether it is even possible.  I don’t find either very plausible.  In fact, I would say that under such conditions, we are not talking about hope, but the vice of presumption.

More modestly, I would endorse the conditional conclusion that if there can be a virtuous hope for a perfect being, such a being exists.

My Top 13 Best Arguments for God

Here is a list of the 13 best argument for God’s existence that I have written or formulated:

  1. The Bonaventurean Ontological Argument
  2. The Modal Ontological Argument from Divine Simplicity
  3. The Modal Ontological Argument from Anselm’s Apophatic Definition
  4. The Anselmian Ontological Argument
  5. The Cartesian Ontological Argument
  6. The Argument for an Omnipotent Being from Aristotelian Actualism
  7. A Mereological Interpretation of Aquinas’s Third Way
  8. The Argument from Essential Uniqueness
  9. The Indispendability Modal Ontological Argument (Voltairean Variation)
  10. A Deontic-Ontological Argument from Gratitude
  11. The Argument from Hope
  12. An Induction based on the Modal Ontological Argument
  13. The Knowability Argument for an Omniscient Mind

 

Improving the Formulation of Bonaventure’s OA

The following formulation relies on one less premise than my previous formulation, and avoids the implication that there are not objects which refer to God and which are not completely God, i.e. that there are not objects of thought to which “God” refers (a problem that resulted from the way I formulated P2 in the earlier version).

D1) God is absolutely complete
P1) If no objects to which “God” refers  are objects that truly and completely possess the divine essence, then God is not absolutely complete.
P2) If there is an object to which “God” refers and it truly and completely has the divine essence, then God exists in reality.
C) God exists in reality

Let,

Cx ≝ x is absolutely complete
Dx ≝ x truly and completely has the divine essence
Rxy ≝ x is the entity to which “y” refers
E!x ≝ x exists in reality
g ≝ (ɿx)Cx

1. (∀x)(Rxg → ~Dx) → ~Cg (premise)
2. (∃x)(Rxg ∧ Dx) → E!g (premise)
3. (∀x)(Rxg → ~Dx) (IP)
4. ~Cg (1,3 MP)
5. (∃x)[Cx ∧ (∀y){[Cy →(y = x)] ∧ ~Cx} (4 theory of descriptions)
6. [Cμ ∧ (∀y){[Cy →(y = μ)] ∧ ~Cμ (5 EI)
7. [(∀y){[Cy →(y = μ) ∧ Cμ] ∧ ~Cμ (6 Comm)
8. (∀y){[Cy →(y = μ) ∧ [Cμ ∧ ~Cμ] (7 Assoc)
9. Cμ ∧ ~Cμ (8 Simp)
10. ~(∀x)(Rxg → ~Dx) (3-9 IP)
11. ~(∀x)(~Rxg ∨ ~Dx)(10 Impl)
12. ~(∀x)~(Rxg ∧ Dx)(11 DeM)
13. (∃x)~~(Rxg ∧ Dx) (12 QN)
14. (∃x)(Rxg ∧ Dx) (13 DN)
15. E!g (2,14 MP)

QED

A Formulation of Bonaventure’s Ontological Argument

franc3a7ois2c_claude_28dit_frc3a8re_luc29_-_saint_bonaventure

Image Source: Wikipedia “Bonaventure

<<Si Deus est Deus, Deus est.>>

Bonaventure writes the following argument:

No one can be ignorant of the fact that this is true: the best is the best; or think that it is false. But the best is a being which is absolutely complete. Now any being which is absolutely complete, for this very reason, is an actual being. Therefore, if the best is the best, the best is. In a similar way, one can argue: If God is God, then God is. Now the antecedent is so true that it cannot be thought not to be. Therefore, it is true without doubt that God exists (Bonaventure, De mysterio trinitatis 1.1 fund. 29 (ed. Quaracchi V 48).

The overly-simplified version of the argument is:

P1) If God is God, then God is.

P2) God is God.

C) God is.

Noone and Houser (2013) write, “…the premise If God is God is not an empty tautology (Seifert 1992, 216–217). It means ‘if the entity to which the term God refers truly possesses the divine essence.’ And the conclusion means that such an entity must exist.”  This inspired me to reconstruct Bonaventure’s argument as best I can.

Informally the argument is:

D1) “God” is the absolutely complete being.
P1) There is an object to which the term “God” refers.
P2) If the object to which the term “God” refers does not truly and completely possess the divine essence, then God is not absolutely complete.
P3) If object to which the term “God” refers truly and completely possesses the divine essence, then God exists in reality.
C) God, the being who truly and completely possesses the divine essence, exists in reality.
Explanation of D1: Here we stipulate that God is defined as complete in every positive simple attribute, which is to say that by “God”, we mean a perfect being. This definitions is a definite description, i.e. it refers to a singular term, since absolute completeness implies omnipotence, and there can only be one omnipotent being. For, if there were two, one could will contrary to the other, and absurdity would follow. A stipulation is to be granted, so long as it is coherent, otherwise any conclusion could be deduced from it. As to whether the definition of an absolutely complete being is coherent, it should be noted that perfections, in being both simple and positive, cannot contain any explicit or implicit contradiction, and so the stipulate is logically coherent.
Defense of P1: This is to say that the term “God” refers to some imagined, conceived, or real object. The atheist should agree that “God” refers to some object, even if the object is just something in the theist’s fancy.
Defense of P2: Since the antecedent of (P2) specifies a way in which object to which the term “God” refers would be incomplete, it follows of analytic necessity that the object named by “God” is not absolutely complete, i.e. God is not absolutely complete.

Defense of P3: To grant that there is an object which truly and completely possesses the divine essence is semantically equivalent to granting that that which everyone calls “God”, i.e. a perfect being, exists in reality.

Further notes:

  • In other words, it is asking whether the object to which “God” refers is a perfect being. If it is not a perfect being, then “God” means an absolutely complete being and does not refer to an absolutely complete being. There is an “incompleteness” inherent in this relationship, which means that if “God” fails to refer to that which is truly God, then we mean that God, a complete being, is not a complete being. Our sense of “God” would be contradictory in nature.
  • We cannot include in the sense of what “God” is, the notion that “God” refers to something that isn’t completely God.
  • The only consistent alternative is to mean that the object which we name “God” exists in reality, and completely has the divine essence.
  • What Bonaventure is saying is that the sense of “God” must include that it references God, or else the the sense is incoherent. So to grant that there is an object to which the sense of “God” refers is sufficient to prove there is God.

Formally:

Let,

Cx ≝ x absolutely complete
Dx ≝ x truly and completely has the divine essence
Rxy ≝ x is the entity to which “y” refers
E!x ≝ x exists in reality
g ≝ (ɿx)Cx

1. (∃x)Rxg (premise)
2. (∀x)[(Rxg ∧ ~Dx) → ~Cg] (premise)
3. (∃x)(Rxg ∧ Dx) → E!g (premise)
4. Rμg (1 EI)
5. Rμg ∧ ~Dμ (IP)
6. (Rμg ∧ ~Dμ) → ~Cg (2 UI)
7. ~Cg (5,6 MP)
8. (∃x)[Cx ∧ (∀y){[Cy →(y = x)] ∧ ~Cx} (7 theory of descriptions)
9. [Cν ∧ (∀y){[Cy →(y = ν)] ∧ ~Cν (8 EI)
10. [(∀y){[Cy →(y = ν) ∧ Cν] ∧ ~Cν (9 Comm)
11. (∀y){[Cy →(y = ν) ∧ [Cν ∧ ~Cν] (10 Assoc)
12. Cν ∧ ~Cν (11 Simp)
14. ~(Rμg ∧ ~Dμ) (5-13 IP)
15. ~Rμg ∨ ~~Dμ (14 DeM)
16. ~~Rμg (4 DN)
17. ~~Dμ (15,16 DS)
18. Dμ (17 DN)
19. Rμg ∧ Dμ (4,18 Conj)
20 (∃x)(Rxg ∧ Dx) (19 EG)
21. E!g (3,20 MP)

QED

References:

Noone, Tim and Houser, R. E., “Saint Bonaventure”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/bonaventure/&gt;.

Seifert, Josef, 1992. “‘Si Deus est Deus, Deus est’: Reflections on St. Bonaventure’s Interpretation of St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument,” Franciscan Studies, 52: 215–231.

Combining Aquinas and the MOA

Here is a variation on my argument from Anselm to Plantinga:

P1) Possibly, there is an absolutely metaphysically simple being.
P2) Necessarily, that there is an absolutely metaphysically simple being implies that there is a maximally great being.
P3) If it’s possible that something is maximally great, then it’s possible that necessarily there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
C) There is an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being.

Defense of P1: An absolutely metaphysically simple being, insofar as it is being, is attributed positively, cannot contain a part that negates its essential nature, which means it does not contain inconsistent properties or attributes.  Now, it has been objected, by none other than Plantinga, that the concept of a metaphysically simple being is incoherent, but as Vallicella (2019) points out, one need not adopt the metaphysical framework by which that incoherence is pressed.  Thus the metaphysical possibility of an absolutely metaphysical being will depend on the supposition of a “constituent”  metaphysical frame work.  Vallicella (2019) writes, the “constituent” metaphysicians “…did not think of individuals as related to their properties as to abstracta external to them, but as having properties as ontological constituents.”  This roughly tracks Aristotelian realism over Platonic realism, which I think is a decisively preferable metaphysical framework, given the third-man objection to Platonism.  With these considerations in mind, I think it is highly plausible to defend the metaphysical possibility of an absolutely simple being.

Defense of P2: Aquinas demonstrates that an absolutely metaphysically simple being is metaphysically necessary (since its has existence essentially, see [3]-[4]), omnipotent (since God is infinite, which is derived from His simplicity), omniscient (see, in particular, [3]), and the good of every good (see [3]) and the highest good (see [5]), so omnibenevolent.  Now one might object that a maximally great being has many divine attributes and is, therefore, not absolutely metaphysically simple, but Aquinas explains that the plurality of divine attributes is not opposed to divine simplicity.  Since the attributes of a maximally great being can be deduced from an absolutely simple being, we can conclude that the existence of an absolutely simple being necessarily implies an maximally great being (where maximal greatness is defined as a necessarily existing, omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being).

Defense of P3: This implication follows from Plantinga’s stipulative definitions of maximal greatness, and maximal excellence, with a slight deviation from moral perfection to omnibenevolence, defined in Thomistic terms.  So this is an analytically true implication.

Let,

Mx ≝ x is maximally great
Ox ≝ x is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent
Sx ≝ x is absolutely metaphysically simple
Theorem of K: ☐(p → q) → (♢p → ♢q)
Theorem of S5: ♢☐p → ☐p
Axiom M: ☐p → p

1. ♢(∃x)Sx (premise)
2. ☐[(∃x)Sx → (∃y)My](premise)
3. ♢(∃y)My → ♢☐(∃z)Oz (premise)
4. ☐[(∃x)Sx → (∃y)My]] → [♢(∃x)Sx → ♢(∃y)My] (Theorem of K)
5. ♢(∃x)Sx → ♢(∃y)My (2,4 MP)
6. ♢(∃y)My (1,5 MP)
7. ♢☐(∃z)Oz (3,6 MP)
8. ♢☐(∃z)Oz → ☐(∃z)Oz (Theorem of S5)
9. ☐(∃z)Oz (7,8 MP)
10. ☐(∃z)Oz → (∃z)Oz (Axiom M)
11. (∃z)Oz (9,10 MP)

QED

References:

Vallicella, William F., “Divine Simplicity”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/divine-simplicity/&gt;.

 

Anselm’s God to Plantinga’s God

Prefatory Remarks:

There is a slight difference in the way Anselm and Plantinga define God.  Anselm’s definition is that God is that than which none greater can be conceived.  Plantinga’s God is a maximally great being, i.e. a necessarily existing being that has omnipotence, omniscience, and morally perfection.  Anselm’s definition is negative, while Plantinga’s is positive.  Anselm’s definition fits with the apophatic tradition of a negative theology, i.e. God is not among those things of which a greater can be conceived.  It is because Anselm’s definition is negative that I contend that Thomas Aquinas is incorrect in his central critique of the ontological argument.  Anselm isn’t offering a positive account of God’s essential nature.  I agree with Aquinas that a positive account of God’s essential nature cannot be completely and univocally known to us, but I should also say that although Plantinga’s definition is positive, it is not claimed to be complete and it need not be interpreted as perfections of “power”, “knowledge”, and “goodness” as those terms are understood univocally.

There is still a strong relationship between the Anselmian definition of God and the Plantingan definition.  Namely, one can derive from the Anselmian definition various divine attributes like necessary existence, omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection, among other perfections.  So one can argue that if there is an Anselmian God, then there is a maximally great being, in the Plantingan sense.  Indeed, that impication necessarily holds, given that it analytically follows from the Anselmian definition.  As an aside, I would argue that the two definitions are not equivalent in that one cannot derive the Anselmian definition from the Plantingan definition.  So, the existence of a maximally great being would not necessarily imply the existence of Anselm’s God.

Another interesting aspect of Anselm’s definition is that, since it is negative, I think the case for its metaphysical possibility can be firmly established.  Now, I am not suggesting that Anselm makes a modal inference that the metaphysical possibility of God, as he defines it, entails his actual existence.  Still, it is often disputed that conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility. However, in this particular case, the conceivability of the Anselmian God makes the following falsehood self-evident, viz. that it is somehow metaphysically necessary that for any object, there will always be something else one could conceive of which would be greater.

Given that Plantinga’s maximally great being is a necessarily existing omnipotent, omnicient, and morally perfect being, I think there may be a powerful way to combine the fact that we can understand the Anselmian God, and show the Anselmian God possible, and use that to demonstrate the existence of a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.  In what follows, I exploit Anselm to vindicate Plantinga.

Informal Expression of the Argument:

P1) If I can understand the Anselmian definition of God, then it is not necessarily the case that, for any given thing, there will be something conceivably greater.
P2) If it is possible that there is something than which none greater can be conceived, then it is possible that there is an Anselmian God.
P3) The existence of the Anselmian God necessarily implies the existence of a maximally great being.
P4) I can understand the Anselmian definition of God.
P5) If it’s possible that something is maximally great, then it’s possible that there is a necessarily existing, omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
C) There is an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

A Formal Expression of the Argument:

P1) If it is possible that the Anselmian God is in the understanding, then it is not necessary that, for all x, it is conceivable that there is y and y is greater than x.
P2) If it is possible that there is something, x, such that it is not conceivable that there is some y and y is greater than x, then it is possible that there is something, z, and z is the Anselmian God.
P3) Necessarily, if there is something that is the Anselmian God, then there is something that is maximally great.
P4) It is possible that the Anselmian God is in the understanding
P5) If it is possible that there is something that is maximally great, then it is possibly necessary that there is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
C) There is something that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.

Formal Deductive Proof of the Argument:

Let,

Mx ≝ x is maximally great
Ox ≝ x is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect
Ux ≝ x is in the understanding
Gxy ≝ x is greater than y
©… ≝ it is conceivable that…
g ≝ (ɿx)(~©(∃y)Gyx)
Theorem of K: ☐(p → q) → (♢p → ♢q)
Theorem of S5: ♢☐p → ☐p
Axiom M: ☐p → p

1. ♢Ug → ~☐(∀x)©(∃y)(Gyx) (premise)
2. ♢(∃x)~©(∃y)(Gyx) → ♢(∃z)(z = g) (premise)
3. ☐[(∃z)(z = g) → (∃x)Mx] (premise)
4. ♢Ug (premise)
5. ♢(∃x)Mx → ♢☐(∃y)Oy (premise)
6. ☐[(∃z)(z = g) → (∃x)Mx] → [♢(∃z)(z = g) → ♢(∃x)Mx] (Theorem of K)
7. ~☐(∀x)©(∃y)(Gyx) (1,4 MP)
8. ~~♢~(∀x)©(∃y)(Gyx)(7 ME)
9. ♢~(∀x)©(∃y)(Gyx)(8 DN)
10. ♢(∃x)~©(∃y)(Gyx)(9 QN)
11. ♢(∃z)(z = g) (2,10 MP)
12. ♢(∃z)(z = g) → ♢(∃x)Mx (3,6 MP)
13. ♢(∃x)Mx (11,12 MP)
14. ♢☐(∃y)Oy (5,13 MP)
15. ♢☐(∃y)Oy → ☐(∃y)Oy (Theorem of S5)
16. ☐(∃y)Oy (14,15 MP)
17. ☐(∃y)Oy → (∃y)Oy (Axiom M)
18. (∃y)Oy (16,17 MP)

QED

An Argument from Hope

P1) Hope is a virtue.

P2) If God does not exist, hope is not a virtue.

C) God exists.

Defense of P1: Hope is a habit of the will by which one desires a good and expects to receive it.  As in many virtues, hope is a mean between extremes, as one can desire a good in a disordered way (too much or too little in relation to other things good or bad), and ones expectations can be too high or too low for evidential reasons.  Hope, then, involves achieving a mean in both what one desires and what one expects, which shows that there is a certain state of character that admits of a mean between extremes that tends towards our good.  There are goods that we can appropriately desire, and which we can reasonably expect to obtain.  So hope is a virtue.

Defense of P2:  Schopenhauer is right, and Nietzsche is wrong.  If there is no God, there is no external, objective, and ultimate source of meaning, i.e. there is no global meaning and any local attempts at meaning is futile.  Pessimism is the appropriate expectation, and hope is, therefore, a vicious extreme. Likewise, no good is all that good in the long run, so one should not desire any good more than non-existence, which the anti-natalist philosopher, David Benatar, notes is at least “not-bad”.  The “not-badness” of non-existence outweighs the minor goods found in existence when they are stacked along side the immense amount of suffering and misery life doles out.  Therefore, even if there is a minor good that one might reasonably expect, hope is still vicious because, on the whole, one is desiring a good disproportionately, when one should favor the blessings of non-existence, once one has truly weighed out everything.  As Schopenhauer writes:

Again, you may look upon life as an unprofitable episode, disturbing the blessed calm of non-existence.  And, in any case, even though things have gone with you tolerably well, the longer you live the more clearly you will feel that life is a disappointment, nay, a cheat…” (On the Sufferings of the World, 1851).

What about Nietzsche and Russell?  Both admit that with atheism, there is no ultimate sort of meaning.  But Nietzsche resists the pessimistic implication by supposing that we can invent meaning from within.  Can this be done while also recognizing that this meaning is subjectively invented?  Can you fall for an illusion while also noting that it is an illusion?  Russell writes:

…[A]lthough it is of course gloomy view to suppose that life will die out—at least I suppose we may say so, although sometimes when I contemplate the thing that people do with their lives I think it is almost a consolation—it is not such as to render life miserable (Why I am not A Christian, 1927).

Almost a consolation?  We can be a “Pollyanna” and turn our attention to local goals, but in the end, we know that these goods and are ultimate justifications cannot make hope, the expectation and desire of goods, a mean between extremes.  Virtuous hope, in a godless world, is impossible because it would be based the illusory belief that our invented meaning is better than it really is, or that, in the long run, the illusion that we can reasonable to expect such goods for any decent amount of time into our brief and decrepit future.  Hope, in a godless world, becomes the vice of presumption, where desires and expectations are not aligned with the reality of the situation.

But then again, hope really is a virtue, so given the validity of the argument, God exists.

That an Omnipotent Individual Exists

Here is an argument that an omnipotent individual exists:

P1) All potentialities are things, or states of affairs, that can be realized by an actually existing individual or an actually existing mereological sum.

P2) All metaphysical possibilities are potentialities.

C1) All metaphysical possibilities are things, or states of affairs, that can be realized by an actually existing individual or an actually existing mereological sum (P1,P2 Modus Barbara).

P3) If all metaphysical possibilities are things, or states of affairs, that can be realized by an actually existing individual or an actually existing mereological sum, then some individual is an omnipotent being or some mereological sum is an omnipotent being.

C2) Some individual is an omnipotent being or some mereological sum is an omnipotent being. (C1,P3 Modus Ponens).

P4) No thing that is contingent is an omnipotent being.

P5) All mereological sums are things that are contingent.

C3) No mereological sum is an omnipotent being (P4,P5 Modus Celarent).

C4) It is not the case that some mereological sum is an omnipotent being (C3 Contradiction).

C5) Some individual is an omnipotent being (C2,C4 Disjunctive Syllogism).

C6) There is an individual that is an omnipotent being (C5 Semantic Equivalence).

QED

Defense of premises:

Support for P1: This is a statement of actualism, the metaphysical thesis that anything that is potentially real must be grounded in something that is actually real.  That is, potentials are the powers that actualities possess.

Support for P2: Here, I defend this implication as following from the definition of what a metaphysical possibility is, namely, a real potential that can be actualized.  That is, these are genuine possibilities, and not mere epistemic possibilities, and so are properly potentially real things, or states of affairs.

Support for P3:  The implication, here, is that there is either an individual or set of things that is the actuality by which all potentials can be realized. That is, if all potentials can be realized by something actual, then that actuality, be it individually or collectively, is omnipotent.  This is the definition of omnipotence.  Note that this premises is neutral on the question of whether the set of “all metaphysical possibilities” is finite or infinite.  However, to be omnipotent, it is sufficient that one has the power to actualize all of the metaphysical possibilities there are.  It need not be established that the set is infinite, though I suspect it is.  To be omnipotent, one must possess the ability to actualize all of the metaphysical possibilities that there are.

Support for P4: A thing that is contingent is not the source of its own existence, and therefore cannot be the actuality by which its own existence obtains.  The potential for a contingent thing to exist must exist in some other actuality beyond itself.

Support for P5: A mereological sum is a collection of things that, grouped together, compose some whole.  All collections of things are contingent on their parts, and the arrangement or structure by which those parts really compose a whole, just as a human is contingent upon the atoms which compose his body.

An Inductive Way of Thinking about the Modal Ontological Argument

P1. If philosophers of religion over the past 50+ years have successfully defended the coherence of the concept of a maximally great God, then probably a maximally great God is metaphysically possible.
P2. The metaphysical possibility of a maximally great God entails that a maximally great God exists.
P3. Philosophers of religion over the past 50+ years have successfully defended the coherence of the concept of a maximally great God.
C. Probably a maximally great God exists.

I think this argument also helps to distinguish between epistemic possibility (I think it is probable because of sustained intellectual scrutiny) and metaphysical possibility.

Also, I should note that by the coherence of the concept of a maximally great God, I mean more than mere consistency among the attributes, or even self-consistency of each attribute, but also the coherence of theism with other facts, necessary or contingent, e.g. evil or suffering.