P1. If philosophers of religion over the past 50+ years have successfully defended the coherence of the concept of a maximally great God, then probably a maximally great God is metaphysically possible.
P2. The metaphysical possibility of a maximally great God entails that a maximally great God exists.
P3. Philosophers of religion over the past 50+ years have successfully defended the coherence of the concept of a maximally great God.
C. Probably a maximally great God exists.
I think this argument also helps to distinguish between epistemic possibility (I think it is probable because of sustained intellectual scrutiny) and metaphysical possibility.
Also, I should note that by the coherence of the concept of a maximally great God, I mean more than mere consistency among the attributes, or even self-consistency of each attribute, but also the coherence of theism with other facts, necessary or contingent, e.g. evil or suffering.
Recently, I’ve had a little debate on Facebook that has prompted my interlocutor to take to his own blog in order to clarify his views and rebut my argument. Unfortunately, in the process, I believe my own position has been misrepresented, so I thought I would discuss some of the issues here and respond to some of his claims.
Essentially, my interlocutor fails to understand why Hume’s skeptical argument against rationalism is problematic for his particular epistemology. In fact, he thinks the argument can be ignored precisely because it leads to untoward consequences. And he thinks that I am guilty of special pleading because I do not think this problem affects my own epistemology. But before I respond to these issues, a little background on the debate is needed.
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