1) We act morally wrong when we treat Being Itself merely as a means to our own ends.
2) If we act morally wrong when we treat Being Itself merely as a means to our own ends, Being Itself is an end in itself.
3) Whatever is an end in itself has autonomy.
4) Therefore Being Itself is autonomous.
5) Whatever is autonomous has personhood, i.e rationally and freely wills the moral law.
6) Therefore Being itself has personhood, i.e. Being Itself rationally and freely wills the moral law.
- When we sin, we utilize existing things for our own ends. Those things exist insofar as they participate in Being Itself. So we are literally treating Being Itself like a tool, or an object for our own benefit. And that is sinful because Being Itself is not an object. One ought not do this not only because it is a category error, but also because it is a failure to recognize the dignity of Being Itself. This bridges the is/ought divide and explains why our moral duties are grounded in reality. Divine Autonomy is realized in the teleology of beings. We sin when we subvert that telos in a way that completely instumentalizes their being, and so God’s as well. To subvert the telos of beings in this way is nothing more than self-worship.
- This is why evil cannot exist on pantheism or naturalism. You can’t sin against Being Itself, if Being Itself is merely objective. That is, you would be treating it as it is, not as it is not. This is also why our own autonomy is threatened when we accept pantheism or naturalism.
- Satan wanted to be a god without “recognizing” that his “being” is from God. Without that recognition, God is treated as a mere tool, which is blasphemy of the highest order. And yet saints are just those who want to be gods through “recognizing” that their “being” is from God. And thus it is God’s autonomy and grace by which the saints are divinized. To treat Being Itself as autonomous is to recognize Being’s gratuitousness towards us and our own radical contingency. It is also to recognize our humble place is not at the top or center of creation, let alone Being.
- Animals cannot be treated as merely means even if they lack autonomy. Actually this might explain why they can’t be treated as mere means, despite not being autonomous. Mistreatment of animals is not a violation of animal autonomy, but the autonomy of Being itself. Thus, all violations of the moral law are violations against autonomy, be it in us, or in Being Itself. The same may hold for plants, and ecosystems. We can use such things, but not abuse them. We cannot lose sight of the dignity of Being even as we consume the fruits of our labor and cultivate the land.
Here is my talk on the Moral Arguments. A few points were rushed towards the end. And I was getting a lot of audio in my headphones, which I should have muted because it distracted me. So apologies for that! Otherwise, I think it is a helpful summary of some of the major issues, as well as a brief introduction to my modalized version of the argument. I hope to take my modalized version of the argument to the next level by presenting it at some conferences, but it still needs some work.
This Sunday I will be on Good Reasons to Believe asking the question “Are Moral Arguments Any Good?”
In the show, I will develop a couple of versions of the moral argument, and assess whether I think they are ultimately successful. In particular, I will focus on the Kantian version of the argument, which may be less familiar to some. So tune in!
Details: the show streams through Ustream live (Sunday 6/9 4pm UK time, 11am EST, 10 am CST). You should be able to find the show through this link NCG Studios: The Place. See you there!!
P.S. If you miss the show, I’ll post the YouTube archive when it becomes available.
Paul Oppenheimer and Edward Zalta (2011) have used Prover9 to check the validity of Anselm’s ontological argument. The program not only proved the argument’s validity, but went on to derive a simplified version of the argument containing only one non-logical premise and avoiding many of the metaphysical pitfalls of Anselm’s original formulation. Their article, A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument, appears in the June issue of the Australian Journal of Philosophy.
In plain English, the one non-logical second premise of the simplified argument reads:
If the conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable fails to exist, then something greater than it is conceivable (348).1
[Spoiler Alert] Oppenheimer and Zalta do not claim that this simplified version of the argument is sound. They think the premise has some prima facie plausibility (ibid.). Further analysis reveals that the defender of the ontological argument must provide an independent argument to think the premise is true. Still, they seem to suggest that such an independent argument could be constructed out of their previous work. They write:
Our 1991 analysis of the argument is still relevant, since it shows how the ontological arguer could justify Anselm’s use of the definite description. The present analysis
shows why the use of the definite description needs independent justification. Consequently, though the simplified ontological argument is valid, Premise 2 is questionable and to the extent that it lacks independent justification, the simplified argument fails to demonstrate that God exists. The use of computational techniques in systematic metaphysics has illuminated the relationship between Premise 2 of the ontological argument and the conclusion that God exists (349).
So the argument in plain English would run something like this:
1. Nothing greater is conceivable than the conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable.
2. If the conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable fails to exist, then something greater than it is conceivable.
3. Therefore, the conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable does not fail to exist.
Premise One does seem to be a priori true. So, in this formulation, the question of the soundness of the argument really does come down to Premise 2. All else being equal, is a conceivable thing that exists greater than a conceivable thing that fails to exist? Kant would say no. Existence is not a real predicate! But I don’t remember Kant really giving an argument for this. All he gives is a weak analogy about thalers, the Prussian currency of his day. Kant argues that 100 real thalers does not contain a coin more than 100 imagined thalers. Thus, by analogy, “that God exists” adds nothing to the concept of God. Now it might be true that 100 imagined thalers have as many coins as 100 real thalers. But the for the analogy to hold, the question is not with regard to the equality of coins between the two, but which is greater. So I offer the following prize: if you can prove that 100 imagined dollars are just as great as 100 real dollars, you win 100 imagined dollars. Once you have submitted the proof just close your eyes and imagine that green-hued Benjamin Franklin with his perturbed expression. Are you not motivated to win the prize? Would you prefer that I offer you a real 100 dollar bill for the proof? Why?
[An Aside] The fact that a computer program was able to refine the ontological argument is quite intriguing to me. Suppose the singularity occurs, as predicted by some futurists. What if the resulting super-intelligent machines were able to demonstrate the soundness of the ontological argument? Would these super-intelligent machines develop religion?
1P. Oppenheimer & E. Zalta. (2011). “A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2): 333-349.