P1. If a maximally great being is impossible, then it is possible that I am worthy of worship.
P2. It is not possible that I am worthy of worship.
C1. A maximally great being is not impossible [from P1 and P2 Modus Tollens].
C2. A maximally great being is possible [from C1 by Obversion].
P3. If a maximally great being is possible, there is a maximally great being.
C3. There is a maximally great being [C2 and P3 Modus Ponens].
Defense of Premises:
P1. If there are no possible worlds where there is a being that has a maximal set of compossible great-making properties, then there is at least some possible world where I, or my counter-part, is the greatest being that happens to exist, and so I would be of greatest worth, i.e. worthy of worship.
P2. I know, through direct intuitional self-knowledge, that it is metaphysically impossible that I am a being worthy of worship.
P3. A maximally great being is a being that, if it exists in any possible world, exists in all possible worlds, including in the actual world.
As I have argued elsewhere, hope is a habit of the will by which one desires a good and expects to receive it. As in many virtues, hope is a mean between extremes, as one can desire a good in a disordered way (too much or too little in relation to other things good or bad), and ones expectations can be too high or too low depending on what is reasonable to expect. Hope, then, involves achieving a mean in both what one desires and what one expects, which shows that there is a certain state of character that admits of a mean between extremes that tends towards our good.
Thus, if we can virtuously hope for p, we can rationally expect that p. Moreover, it can be argued that if we are ignorant as to whether p is even metaphysically possible, we cannot rationally evaluate whether we ought to expect that p is true. Now, I could contend that a person can virtuously hope for a perfect being, i.e. a being that has all perfections, including necessary existence. If this is so, a perfect being exists.
Some atheists may endorse the virtue of hoping that there is a perfect being, but then they must either claim that one can virtuously hope for that which is inscrutable in terms of expectations (and so deny that such a mean is part of virtue), or they must hold that one can reasonably expect there to be a perfect being without knowing whether it is even possible. I don’t find either very plausible. In fact, I would say that under such conditions, we are not talking about hope, but the vice of presumption.
More modestly, I would endorse the conditional conclusion that if there can be a virtuous hope for a perfect being, such a being exists.