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Bernstein/Ahmed debate on Unbelievable?

Unbelievable? hosted a great debate between C’Zar Bernstein and Arif Ahmed on the Argument from Consciousness for God’s existence: listen here.

A rough outline for Bernstein’s argument was something like:
1. There are non-physical minds.
2. The explanation for (1) is either personal or natural.
3. The explanation is not natural.
4. Therefore, the explanation is personal.

Fleshed out, Bernstein defended an evidential argument, where consciousness doesn’t logically entail the God of classical theism, but that consciousness provides evidential support for classical theism. Most of the debate came down to the first premise, which Bernstein defended by way of the modal argument for the soul.

Ahmed focuses on an eliminativist/Humean response and basically just denied there were persons, and fell back on the claim that we should really only admit into our ontology whatever is strictly needed for science (so no need to talk about conscious persons or moral properties).  A good deal of the discussion focused on whether we have good reason to think persons exist, and I think Bernstein got the better of Ahmed in the end (pointing out how Ahmed couldn’t even really talk about pain without referencing his own awareness of it).  However, this meant that little time was focused on showing why consciousness is good evidence in support of classical theism.  Indeed, I agree with Bernstein that it is good evidence.  However, I think more needs to be said for why this is so.

It’s worth a listen, that is for sure.

You Make Your Own Meaning?

In a recent episode of Unbelievable entitled Is Heaven For Real? Hemant Mehta, the “Friendly Atheist” repeatedly referred to belief in Heaven as “silly.” According to Mehta, belief in heaven is silly because he does not think there is any evidence in support of its existence. He drew an analogy to unicorns, Thor, and Allah, asking his interlocutor, Randal Rauser, whether he was willing to admit that belief in those sorts of beings is silly. Rauser didn’t take the bait and pointed out that heaven is only silly within Mehta’s world-view, and that it is a bit unfriendly for the “friendly atheist” to be so condescending when it comes to beliefs he personally doesn’t think the evidence supports. Indeed.

About 50 minutes into the conversation the host, Justin Brierley, directs the conversation to the question of ultimate meaning and purpose. He raises the specter of the eventual demise of the Earth and the heat death of the universe. Brierley asks if the inevitable heat death of the universe, from an atheistic perspective, ever causes Mehta to wonder whether there was a point to everything. Mehta says that this scientific fact doesn’t make his life any less meaningful. He focuses on how it is amazing to be alive and conscious now and that we must cherish what finite life we have. Better to have lived and lossed than to never have lived at all (a claim that some atheist philosophers seriously question). Perhaps Mehta is correct that life is worth living on an atheist perspective, but he then gives the following account of meaning:

…[I]n terms of the meaning, I mean, you make your own meaning of life, you give your life its own whatever… Whatever makes you happy, you can find your own meaning to life. It doesn’t get cheapened by the fact that ultimately in billions of years we won’t even be around to experience any of this.

Now I obviously think there is meaning to life. And a good deal of that meaning is tied to my belief in God, the immortality of the soul, and the hope that I will one day be reunited with loved ones. Mehta has pointed out that such a belief is “silly” because it lacks evidence. He thinks that most people only believe in an afterlife because it is optimistic and gives them hope. So presumably he must modify his claim from the rather silly notion:

(A) One is permitted to make one’s own meaning based on whatever makes one happy.


(B) One is permitted to make one’s own meaning, so long that meaning makes one happy and isn’t a silly belief, i.e. a belief that lacks (sufficient?) evidence.

Clearly Mehta does not endorse (A) since his entire point during the podcast was that it is silly and wrong-headed for someone to organize her meaning for life around a belief that lacks evidence. (A) permits of such silliness, so it must be dismissed.

So we are left we (B) as the organizing principle for finding meaning. But it is not entirely clear that (B) is coherent. For it advises us to “make” our own meaning rather than, say, “discover” our own meaning. Presumably whatever is made does not exist prior to its creation, and whatever doesn’t exist certainly could not be sufficiently evidenced. So there will be no evidence that a belief in, say, the meaningfulness of friendship, will be a meaning-producing belief prior to the creation of that belief in Mehta’s mind. Anyone who doesn’t happen to share Mehta’s belief, will lack the evidence made apparent by holding the belief, and so infer that the belief is silly. And that makes (B) a rather silly principle.

Perhaps we could say this, Mehta wants us to believe that some state of affairs, call it x, is meaningful. He isn’t demanding evidence for the meaningfulness of x per se, but only for the existence of x. So we might modify what Mehta is claiming to this:

(C) One is permitted to take some state of affairs x as meaningful if there is sufficient evidence that supports x and x makes one happy.

Now this might be a bit more precise. Mehta can say that there is no evidence for a state of affairs where my soul lives an everlasting life of community and bliss, but there is evidence that the mountains and beaches exist, or that family members and friends exist. Mountains, beaches, friends, and family can be meaningful so long as they are a source of happiness for an individual.

Some issues with (C) as a principle of meaning: it is far removed from Mehta’s rather Sartrean über-liberated view that we are free to make our own meaning. Rather, we are restricted to find meaning only in states of affairs for which there is sufficient evidence. Also, rather than an active and free creation of meaning, it sounds as though the states of affairs are meaningful if they create a feeling of happiness in the person. In other words, we are passive in the determination of meaning. So there is tension in what Mehta is saying since he wants to say that we make the meaning, but he bases this on whatever (state if affairs) happens to make us feel happy. Unless Mehta wants to endorse some form of libertarian free will, it’s hard to imagine how “we make our own meaning” is anything like “if there is evidence for x, and x has the effect of making us feel happy, then x has meaning for us.”

These are perhaps minor complaints. The larger issue is whether (C) is really strong enough to prevent something like the belief in God or heaven from being an organizing principle meaning in one’s life. For instance, Mehta might say that there is no evidence that heaven exists, so even though belief in heaven makes one happy, one is not permitted to hold such a silly belief. But one might reply that having a belief in heaven is itself a state of affairs, and the evidence that there is such a belief in one’s mind is self-validating (in the Jamesian sense). Now Mehta might have to modify the principle again such that the state of affairs is restricted to non-mental states of affairs… Perhaps a bit of an ad hoc move, and given what I am about to say, a move Mehta might not want to make…

The most problematic aspect of this theory would be that any such principle would be, in itself, a belief held by Mehta that helped him to determine when it is permissible to take something as meaningful. Presumably a finely honed principle that leads to a non-silly meaning filled life is a meaningful principle to have… One that would that make a person happy, no doubt. Ah, but then we need evidence that this principle correlates with some sufficiently evidenced state of affairs. We can’t just say that the state of affairs is the apprehension of (C) itself, since we are restricting mental state of affairs from being counted (the ad hocmove bites us in the rear). Now let’s suppose Mehta has evidence that supports (C). It is not clear what that evidence would be given our restrictions, but let us suppose it exists. Another problem still looms. Mehta would have to justify his principle of meaning as a “non-silly meaningful belief” by invoking the very principle he uses to justify meaning. So in order to justify that his belief in (C) is permissible to take as meaningful, he must assume that (C) is the right principle by which permissibility of meaning is determined. But that just begs the question, which is, of course, silly. Yet it is clear that (C) would have to be considered meaningful, if it is a principle for determining meaning. So, it cannot be a universal principle. At best, Mehta could call it a rough guide to meaning-making. If it’s just a guide, we can’t know if the guide should restrict meaning formed via religious belief.

Now this is all speculation. I’m really not sure what Mehta meant when he said that we are free to make meaning for ourselves while criticizing those who take religious belief as meaningful. Perhaps his point is that we are all free to make meaning in what ever why we choose and he, as a “friendly atheist” is free to take a condescending posture to the way some people choose to live a meaningful life. If so, I offer the following:

If Mehta grants that we really are free to determine meaning, then I can select Christian doctrine as a set of beliefs that make my life meaningful. Since there is no objective meaning, my appeal to these doctrines is as warranted as any other that a naturalist might invoke. If Christianity is true, then there is a set of objectively meaningful values one must embrace. Those values cannot be fully embraced by a naturalist, since Christian meaning involves belief in God and the soul/after-life (non-natural things). So selecting Christianity is a permissible move whether I am right or Mehta is right. But selecting a naturalist set of meaning and values is valid/right/permissible only if Mehta is correct about naturalism.

Now, you might note that this is something of a wager move. And I can hear the protests! “What about other religious world-views?” My response is to ask the following: why organize my values and ultimate cosmic meaning around any religion that does not posit an immortal soul, or after-life? Why organize meaning around any God who is capricious enough to judge me and not provide sufficient revelation for me to form the relevant sorts of beliefs? Why form meaning around any religious system, which would require the impossible from me, i.e. to merit my own salvation and communion with a perfectly holy being? If there is no soul or afterlife in a religion, then there are no objective cosmic consequences for our beliefs about meaning. If God fails to properly reveal religion by remaining utterly hidden, then I have no chance of selecting the appropriate set of values anyways. So, I wouldn’t concern myself with an unrevealed or long dead religion of the past. So we sweep away unknown religions, and religions that lack souls and after-lives. We are left with a handful of religions to consider. And the majority of non-Christian religions require a set of behaviors to merit heaven/salvation. I don’t think I could ever merit communion with God, so I’m taking those religions off the table. They ask the impossible of anyone who has sinned once. It seems to me that once you work through the alternatives, Christianity is the best bet one can make when it comes to a meaning-generating belief system. At the very least, it offers advantages over any naturalistic system, given that naturalists grant the permissibility of making Christianity the basis for one’s meaning in life. And if they don’t grant that, because it’s a “silly belief,” then we are back to my previous critique of any principle that seeks to prevent one from forming meaning out of a “silly” religious belief.